Awarding Profits in Trademark Infringement Actions: Reconciling the Circuit Split on the Willfulness Requirement with Underlying Trademark Law Rationales by Kroninger, Timothy D.
AWARDING PROFITS IN TRADEMARK 
INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS:  
RECONCILING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON THE 
WILLFULNESS REQUIREMENT WITH 
UNDERLYING TRADEMARK LAW 
RATIONALES 
Timothy D. Kroninger* 
 
2018 MICH. ST. L. REV. 793 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 794 
I. THE FUNCTIONS AND RATIONALES OF TRADEMARKS ............ 799 
A. What are Trademarks?: An Overview ............................. 799 
B. Theories and Rationales for Trademark Protection ......... 802 
1. Setting the Basis: Origins of Trademark Protection . 803 
2. Modern Theories: Protecting Producer Interests ..... 805 
3. Modern Theories: Protecting Consumer Interests ... 807 
II. THE LANHAM ACT AND THE INITIAL WILLFULNESS CIRCUIT  
 SPLIT: COURT DECISIONS PRIOR TO THE 1999 AMENDMENT .. 809 
A. The Lanham Act and Relevant Amendments .................. 809 
B. The Initial Circuit Split .................................................... 813 
1. Circuits Requiring a Showing of Willfulness ............ 813 
2. Circuits Using Willfulness as a Factor in the  
 Determination ........................................................... 817 
III. THE SECOND WILLFULNESS CIRCUIT SPLIT: DECISIONS  
 FOLLOWING THE 1999 AMENDMENT ....................................... 820 
IV. DISCARDING THE BRIGHT-LINE RULE ON WILLFULNESS ....... 826 
A. The Functions of Trademarks Are Destroyed by Any  
                                                   
* Managing Editor, Michigan State Law Review; Expected J.D. 2019, 
Michigan State University College of Law; B.S. 2014, Michigan State 
University. First and foremost, the author would like to thank his father, 
Timothy K. Kroninger, for introducing him to the legal profession at a young 
age and for acting as a mentor and a constant source of inspiration throughout 
law school. The author would additionally like to thank Professor Nancy 
Costello for her input on drafts of this Note, the members of Michigan State 
Law Review for their selfless dedication throughout the writing and 
publication process, and his mom and girlfriend for their unwavering love 
and support. 
 
794 Michigan State Law Review  2018 
 Infringement, Willful or Not ............................................ 826 
B. Applying the Lost Profits Remedy to More Conduct  
 Expands the Deterrent Scope ........................................... 829 
C. Applying the Bright-Line Test Creates Inequitable  
 Results .............................................................................. 832 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 834 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Griffin, a fledgling technology company, was in the process of 
developing its new logo and brand identity, and it had no intention of 
using another company’s logo to deceive consumers into buying its 
product.1 However, Griffin also wanted to get its products on the 
market quickly for the holiday shopping rush, so it did not conduct 
adequate research on what might and might not already be protected 
by trademark law.2 Griffin’s CEO is a grizzled veteran in the 
technology industry and knew from his own experience that logos with 
bold, block letters accented with stripes perform best in the market.3 
Griffin therefore sent a proposed design to a graphic designer that said 
“GRIFFIN” in big, block green letters with horizontal white stripes 
intersecting each letter.4 The finished product created by the Griffin 
graphic designer looked somewhat similar to the IBM logo, but the 
executives honestly believed it was “different enough.”5 The logo was 
placed on all of Griffin’s boxes and holiday sales soared, causing IBM 
                                                   
 1. See, e.g., Gucci Am., Inc. v. Daffy’s, Inc., 354 F.3d 228, 239 (3d Cir. 
2003); George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532, 1541 (2d Cir. 1992). 
Courts have universally noted that a bad faith intent to deceive would be considered 
willful infringement. See, e.g., George Basch, 968 F.2d at 1541. 
 2. See ANNE GILSON LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 5.09[4][e] 
(Matthew Bender ed., 2018) (discussing how courts determine intent, although 
through the analogous lens of the likelihood of confusion analysis). Failure to conduct 
a trademark search does not by itself lead to a bad faith, willful intent. See id. 
 3. See George Basch, 968 F.2d at 1534. Courts, such as the Second Circuit 
here, have specifically noted that that there is an “essential distinction . . . between a 
deliberate attempt to deceive and a deliberate attempt to compete.” Id. (quoting 
Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569, 572 (2d Cir. 1959)).  
 4. See generally LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 1.02 (providing an overview 
on what constitutes a trademark under the Lanham Act). 
 5. See George Basch, 968 F.2d at 1541. As the Second Circuit noted, 
“[d]epending upon the circumstances, consumer confusion might as easily result from 
an innocent competitor who inadvertently crosses the line between a ‘free ride’ and 
liability, as it could from a defendant’s intentionally fraudulent conduct.” Id. 
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to lose some sales.6 Three weeks later, Griffin received notice of a 
trademark infringement action from IBM.7 
Cerberus is a small technology company that was also in the 
process of developing a new logo and brand identity.8 However, unlike 
Griffin, Cerberus only wanted to turn a quick profit and then 
completely exit the industry to reinvest elsewhere.9 Cerberus thus 
decided from the outset to take the Apple logo and subtly change some 
of the shading, hoping that consumers would see the Cerberus 
products, think that they were Apple products, and complete their 
purchase.10 Cerberus set up a small kiosk in one of the local shopping 
malls and sold thousands of products to rushed holiday shoppers, 
causing Apple to lose sales.11 Three weeks after raking in a handsome 
profit, it too received notice of an infringement action.12 
Both Griffin and Cerberus were eventually found liable of 
trademark infringement, as both instances involved the infringing use 
of a registered mark creating a likelihood of confusion.13 But in some 
circuits, the intent to deceive consumers will determine whether the 
court will divest the defendant of its profits.14 Griffin would escape 
without having to relinquish any profits while Cerberus would have to 
pay its profits back to Apple—even though the end result of 
infringement and harm to the plaintiff is the same.15  
                                                   
 6. See Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional 
Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 
WIS. L. REV. 158, 163 (discussing that consumer confusion of source that results in 
diversion of trade underlies traditional trademark theory). 
 7. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2012) (describing the basis for a trademark 
infringement civil action). 
 8. See generally LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 1.02. 
 9. See id. at § 5.09[2] (“When courts examine a defendant’s intent . . . they 
are asking whether the defendant meant to capitalize on the plaintiff’s good will by 
causing consumers to believe that the defendant’s product was created or sponsored 
by the plaintiff.”). 
 10. See Denicola, supra note 6, at 160, 163. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See § 1125(a) (identifying the requirements for a trademark infringement 
civil action). 
 13. See generally LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 5.01 (describing the likelihood 
of confusion test for determining trademark infringement).  
 14. See, e.g., Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 875 F.3d 426, 
434-35 (9th Cir. 2017); George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532, 1541 
(2d Cir. 1992) (discussing how the intent to deceive is what separates willful and non-
willful infringement). The Ninth Circuit has been one of the longstanding proponents 
of the idea that only willful infringers—that is, those who intend to deceive or 
knowingly deceive—can be forced to give all profits earned to the plaintiff. See Stone 
Creek, 875 F.3d at 434-35. 
 15. Griffin had no intent to deceive and the infringement was not done 
knowingly, so it would not be forced to relinquish its profits to the plaintiff in a bright-
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The remedies provision of the Lanham Act provides that, upon 
a showing of trademark infringement, a court may award to the 
plaintiff the defendant’s profits, the plaintiff’s damages, and the costs 
of the action, “subject to the principles of equity.”16 The meaning of 
the “subject to the principles of equity” language, which was not 
defined in the statute, has led to debate among the federal circuit 
courts, particularly as to whether the “principles of equity” require a 
showing of willful trademark infringement for an awarding of the 
defendant’s profits.17 Individually interpreting the “principles of 
equity,” some courts have established a bright-line rule requiring a 
showing of willfulness for awarding profits while other courts only 
took willfulness into account as one factor of many, thereby creating 
a circuit split that remains unsettled.18 
In 1996, Congress added a federal cause of action for trademark 
dilution to the Lanham Act.19 When Congress eventually linked the 
dilution cause of action provision to the remedies portion of the 
Lanham Act, it specifically added that only a willful, non-innocent 
violation would allow the plaintiff to recover the defendant’s profits 
in a dilution action.20 The application of the “willful” wording only to 
trademark dilution and not trademark infringement in the 1999 
amendment further widened the circuit split and increased confusion 
on an already complicated and heavily divisive issue in trademark 
law.21 
                                                   
line rule jurisdiction such as the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., Stone Creek, 875 F.3d at 434-
35; Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 817 F.3d 782, 791 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 
 16. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012). Trademark infringement refers to trademark 
use that creates a likelihood of confusion under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) and is regarded 
as a concept distinct from trademark dilution, described in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2012). 
See LALONDE, supra note 2, at §§ 5.01, 5A.01. Mentions of trademark infringement 
throughout this Note are thus referring solely to infringement actions relating to a 
likelihood of confusion; actions relating to trademark dilution will be noted as such. 
See id. 
 17. Stone Creek, 875 F.3d at 440 (“The spirited debate among the circuits has 
been reserved for how the phrase ‘subject to the principles of equity’ applies to an 
award of the defendant’s profits.”). 
 18. Id. (“Our circuit fell in line with the camp that requires a showing of 
willfulness. . . . In the other camp were circuits who viewed willfulness as one factor 
in the overall determination of whether an award of profits is appropriate. . . . These 
decisions all predate the 1999 amendment.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 19. See § 1125(c). 
 20. See Stone Creek, 875 F.3d at 440-41 (quoting § 1117(a)) (“Congress 
revised the remedies section, § 1117(a), to include reference to a ‘willful violation 
under section 1125(c).’ The amendment thus made clear that a plaintiff with a dilution 
claim could recover money damages.”). 
 21. See id. (“The contrast in language between clause [1], which does not 
reference willfulness, and newly inserted clause [2], which does, has caused ripples 
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In July 2017, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit visited 
the issue of awarding defendant profits for the first time since the 1999 
amendment and reaffirmed its position that willfulness is a 
requirement for the disgorgement of a trademark infringer’s profits.22 
The specific “willfulness” wording in the 1999 amendment applying 
to trademark dilution claims did not change the Ninth Circuit’s 
conclusion that willfulness is necessary to meet the “principles of 
equity” requirement for trademark infringement claims.23 This 
decision is consistent with the Federal Circuit’s holding that the 1999 
amendment does not substantively change its analysis on willfulness 
with regard to trademark infringers and awarding of defendant’s 
profits.24 On the contrary, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have adhered 
to the view that willfulness is only one factor in the overall 
determination of awarding profits in a trademark infringement action, 
and the Third Circuit changed its opinion based on the 1999 
amendment and no longer requires a showing of willfulness to obtain 
an infringer’s profits.25  
Trademarks and trademark law are in a unique position in the 
field of intellectual property law.26 Other forms of intellectual property 
such as patents and copyrights primarily play a role in protecting the 
interests of the producer while attempting to encourage invention or 
creation.27 Trademarks, paradoxically, play a dual role in protecting 
                                                   
through the circuit courts, which remain divided on the role of willfulness in awarding 
profits.”). 
 22. See id. at 441.  
 23. See id. (“We now decide that the 1999 amendment does not change the 
foundation of Ninth Circuit precedent—willfulness remains a prerequisite for 
awarding a defendant’s profits.”). 
 24. See Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 817 F.3d 782, 791 (Fed. Cir. 
2016) (“[N]othing in the 1999 amendment . . . allows [the departure] 
from . . . precedent requiring willfulness for the recovery of profits in infringement 
cases.”). 
 25. See Synergistic Int’l, LLC v. Korman, 470 F.3d 162, 175 (4th Cir. 2006); 
Banjo Buddies, Inc. v. Renosky, 399 F.3d 168, 175 (3d Cir. 2005); Quick Techs., Inc. 
v. Sage Grp. PLC, 313 F.3d 338, 347-49 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 26. See PETER S. MENELL ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW 
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE: 2017 866-67 (2017) (“Trademarks differ in fundamental ways 
from the other types of intellectual property . . . . Patents, copyrights, and trade secrets 
are designed to protect and/or reward something new, inventive, or creative, whether 
it be an idea, discovery, or expressive work. A trademark, by contrast, does not 
‘depend upon novelty, invention, discovery, or any work of the brain. It requires no 
fancy or imagination, no genius, no laborious thought.’ Rather, trademark protection 
is awarded merely to those who were the first to use a distinctive mark in commerce.” 
(internal citations omitted) (quoting Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879))). 
 27. See id. at 867 (“[T]here has been nothing in trademark law analogous to 
the desire to encourage invention or creation . . . . There is no explicit federal policy 
to encourage the creation of more trademarks.”). 
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both the interests of the consumer and of the producer, leading to a 
more obfuscated and varied list of rationales for protection.28 These 
underlying rationales should be a guiding factor for the decisions of 
courts and legislatures on difficult trademark-related decisions, 
including the recent circuit split over the willfulness requirement for 
awarding a defendant’s profits.29 
Intellectual property blogs have noted that the willfulness 
requirement for awarding a defendant’s profits in an infringement 
action is ripe for Supreme Court clarification; thus, it is pertinent to 
revisit the rationales behind why the United States protects trademarks 
in the first place.30 Part I of this Note therefore analyzes the rationales 
behind trademark protection.31 Part II describes the Lanham Act 
generally and the original, pre-1999 amendment circuit split, and 
Part III covers the post-1999 circuit split on willfulness that continues 
today.32 Finally, Part IV analyzes which of the conflicting approaches 
is most harmonious with the rationales behind why the United States 
protects trademarks in the first place.33 Ultimately, trademarks’ dual 
protection of both consumers and producers is best served by a flexible 
rule that does not require willfulness for awarding the plaintiff an 
infringing defendant’s profits, contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s recent 
decision in Stone Creek.34 The harms that the underlying theories of 
trademark protection are designed to alleviate—including source 
                                                   
 28. See id. at n.1 (“These are two very different interests held by different 
parties, both protected by a trademark granted to one of the parties.”). 
 29. See infra Part IV (explaining that the functions of trademarks are best 
protected when all infringement is eliminated; therefore, all courts should be able to 
use profit disgorgement to deter trademark infringement). 
 30. See, e.g., Bill Donahue, The Biggest Open Questions in Trademark Law, 
Part 3, LAW360 (Sept. 1, 2017, 8:26 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/960262/the-biggest-open-questions-in-trademark-
law-part-3 [https://perma.cc/C9H8-S9ZM]; Shannon Turner & Eric Ball, Ninth 
Circuit Confirms Willfulness Is Required to Award Profits in Trademark Cases, 
IPWATCHDOG (July 21, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/07/21/ninth-
circuit-confirms-willfulness-required-award-profits-trademark-cases/id=85865/ 
[https://perma.cc/HH6H-E852]. In May 2018, the Court denied certiorari in Stone 
Creek, the most recent case in the willfulness requirement circuit split. See Stone 
Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 875 F.3d 426 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 
138 S. Ct. 1984 (2018). Therefore, as of publication of this Note, the circuit split on 
the willfulness requirement remains unsolved.  
 31. See infra Part I (discussing the historical origins of trademarks and the 
theories behind why trademarks are protected). 
 32. See infra Parts II & III (discussing the Lanham Act and the first and 
second circuit splits—both of which center around the willfulness requirement in 
awarding the plaintiff an infringing defendant’s profits). 
 33. See infra Part IV.  
 34. See MENELL, supra note 26, at 867; see also Stone Creek, 875 F.3d at 
441. 
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confusion, diversion of sales, and destruction of trademark goodwill—
can occur regardless of whether the infringement is willful or 
innocent.35 Additionally, infringement destroys the beneficial 
functions of trademarks.36 Therefore, the lost profits provision should 
be available for courts to apply as a deterrent, even when infringement 
is not willful.37 
I. THE FUNCTIONS AND RATIONALES OF TRADEMARKS 
Trademarks occupy a unique position in the intellectual property 
field.38 Trademarks have been around since antiquity and have always 
played a role in source identification, acting as the link between a good 
and its source.39 Since then, the popularity of trademarks, especially as 
business assets, has grown exponentially, and the litigation 
surrounding them has correspondingly increased.40 As the uses of 
trademarks and branding have shifted and expanded, and as policies 
emphasizing consumer protection have evolved, trademarks have 
taken on additional and more complicated roles.41 The modern 
trademark thus plays a dual role in protecting both the consumer and 
the producer while also aiding in economic efficiency.42 
A. What Are Trademarks?: An Overview 
Despite the differing theories on the rationales for trademark 
protection, the trademark itself serves one main, overarching 
function¾to distinguish goods from one manufacturer or merchant 
                                                   
 35. See LALONDE, supra note 2, at §§ 1.03, 5.02; MENELL, supra note 26, at 
867. 
 36. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An 
Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269-70 (1987) (discussing how 
infringement by free-riding destroys the ability of certain trademark functions, such 
as the incentive for businesses to invest in the goodwill of a mark). 
 37. See, e.g., Synergistic Int’l, LLC v. Korman, 470 F.3d 162, 175 (4th Cir. 
2006); Otis Clapp & Son, Inc. v. Filmore Vitamin Co., 754 F.2d 738, 744 (7th Cir. 
1985) (noting that damages under the Lanham Act must be sufficient to discourage 
infringement). 
 38. See MENELL, supra note 26, at 867. 
 39. See LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 1.06[1] (describing the history of 
trademark protection). 
 40. See, e.g., id. at § 1.01; Sean Stonefield, The 10 Most Valuable 
Trademarks, FORBES (June 15, 2011, 1:22 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
seanstonefield/2011/06/15/the-10-most-valuable-trademarks/#3c0fd52236b8 
[https://perma.cc/VKM6-6Z6V]. 
 41. See LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 1.03 (identifying the functions and 
rationales for trademark protection). 
 42. See id. at § 1.03[6][c] (noting that trademarks lower search costs). 
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from those of another.43 A trademark is a word, symbol, object, or 
sensation that is given legal protection because it designates the source 
of a product or service.44 Valid trademarks can therefore come in many 
forms, including logos, brand names, package designs, sounds, and 
even colors.45 Examples of some of the best known trademarks include 
Google, Microsoft, Walmart, Apple, and GE.46  
Trademark law broadly encompasses concepts such as brand 
names, trade dress, service marks, certification marks, and collective 
marks.47 These concepts generally share the same legal principles and 
are often colloquially, and perhaps confusingly, simply referred to as 
“marks” or “trademarks.”48 Although common law rights are available 
in the United States without registration upon only a showing of use,49 
federally registering a mark with the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) offers a wide range of valuable benefits.50 
                                                   
 43. See id. at § 1.03[1] (“Though each [rationale] may be slightly different, 
these functions are inextricably linked. A trademark cannot be an indicator of a certain 
quality unless it signifies one particular source to the consumer. Nor can it be a symbol 
of good will or an effective method of advertising unless it has built up a reputation 
associated with a specific source. The consumer benefits of trademarks are all directly 
connected with these functions . . . .”). 
 44. See id. (“A term, symbol, object or sensation functions as a trademark 
and is accorded legal protection when it designates the source or origin of a product 
or service so as to distinguish that product or service from the products or services of 
others, even if the source is, to the consumer, anonymous.”). 
 45. See WILLIAM M. BORCHARD, COWAN, LIEBOWITZ & LATMAN, P.C., A 
TRADEMARK IS NOT A COPYRIGHT OR A PATENT 1, 3 (2014), 
http://www.cll.com/assets/htmldocuments/clientuploads/2014_PTC%20Web.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/CG85-ZCYQ]; see also Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 
U.S. 159, 166 (1995) (discussing how colors can sometimes meet the basic legal 
requirements for use as a trademark). 
 46. See Stonefield, supra note 40. 
 47. See BORCHARD, supra note 45, at 3 (“Trademarks include brand names 
identifying goods (Dole for canned pineapple) and trade dress consisting of the 
graphics, color or shape of packaging or, after sufficient use, of goods (Coca-Cola 
Bottle for a soft drink); service marks identifying services (McDonald’s for a 
restaurant service); certification marks identifying goods or services meeting 
specified qualifications (Woolmark for apparel made of 100% wool); and collective 
marks identifying goods, services, or members of a collective organization (The 
International Game Fish Association for a game fishing organization).”); see also 
LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 1.02[c] (noting that, in some industries, the word “brand” 
or “brand name” is used interchangeably with the word “trademark”). 
 48. See BORCHARD, supra note 45, at 3. 
 49. See id. Note that trademark rights in some countries are solely dependent 
on registration, rather than use (i.e., use is not a prerequisite); cf. LALONDE, supra 
note 2, at § 10.02. 
 50. See LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 4.01 (“[A] federal registration gives rise 
to several important statutory attributes that unregistered marks lack. A federal 
trademark registration establishes federal jurisdiction in a trademark infringement 
action and can be the basis for standing and damages. A principal register trademark 
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Most notably, federal registration allows federal courts to hear 
infringement claims and is required to obtain increased remedies 
against counterfeiters.51  
Trademarks are so intertwined with modern society that it would 
be virtually impossible to go a day without being exposed to one—or 
perhaps, even thousands¾and the importance and popularity of 
trademarks continue to rise.52 Just to scratch the surface, trademarks 
can be found on clothes and accessories, electronics, billboards and 
advertisements, cars, food packages, websites, and television 
broadcasts.53 Unsurprisingly then, a strong trademark can be worth 
billions of dollars to a company, and trademarks are usually the largest 
source of a company’s intangible value.54 For example, in 2011, the 
world’s most valuable trademark, Google, was estimated to have a 
value exceeding $44 billion, with the Microsoft trademark close 
behind at just under $43 billion.55 Companies have not always been 
privy to the intangible value of trademarks, but that has changed in the 
last ten years.56 As a result, trademark registration popularity has 
likewise been growing exponentially.57 In 1870, the year of the earliest 
federal law on trademarks, 121 marks were filed for registration.58 
Over a century later, just over 33,000 marks were filed, including 
                                                   
registration constitutes constructive notice, is prima facie evidence of the right to use 
the mark in interstate commerce to the exclusion of others, can allow the right to use 
the mark to become incontestable under certain circumstances, and may be recorded 
with the United States Bureau of Customs and Border Protection to bar importation 
of goods bearing an infringing trademark.”). 
 51. See BORCHARD, supra note 45, at 4. 
 52. See LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 1.01 (explaining how trademarks have 
become integral assets in business, and thus, extremely prevalent in everyday life).  
 53. See, e.g., id. at § 1.02. 
 54. See Stonefield, supra note 40 (noting that “intangible” refers to an asset 
that cannot be physically touched, unlike a building or machinery). 
 55. Id. Other noteworthy examples include Walmart ($36.2 billion trademark 
value), IBM ($36.2 billion trademark value), Vodafone ($30.7 billion trademark 
value), and Apple ($29.5 billion trademark value). Id. 
 56. See id. (“The single largest source of intangible value in a company is its 
trademark . . . [t]hat insight is a major sea change that has come about over the last 
couple of years . . . .”). Note that this Article was written in 2011. Id. 
 57. See LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 1.01. 
 58. Id. The first trademark issued in the United States as “U.S. Trademark 
Registration No. 1” was a design mark of an eagle accompanied by the words 
“Economical, Beautiful.” Anne H. Chasser, A Historical Perspective: The 
International Trademark Association and the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 31, 34 (2003). Although the eagle design mark was the 
first trademark issued by the United States (Trademark No. 1), it was not the first 
application filed. See id. The first application was filed eight days after the 1870 Act 
by attorney David A. Burr for “‘EXCELSIOR No. 1 Peruvian Guano’ for use in 
connection with fertilizer [products].” Id.  
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registration number 1,000,000 in 1974.59 In 2016 alone, the total 
number of marks filed with the USPTO exceeded 390,000, and 
trademark registration number 5,000,000 was filed.60 Unsurprisingly 
then, nearly every part of an average day involves interacting with 
trademarks in some capacity.61 Trademarks are obviously extremely 
important in modern United States society, but trademark law has not 
always been such a centerpiece of business; it has taken thousands of 
years and the development and traditions of countless societies to 
reach the point it is at today.62 
B. Theories and Rationales for Trademark Protection 
Unlike other forms of intellectual property, the rationales for 
trademark protection are much more obscure and varied.63 The 
Constitution plainly spells out the rationales for patent and copyright 
protection¾rights granted to a producer as an incentive to promote 
progress in the science and arts.64 On the other hand, it is widely 
recognized that trademarks function broadly to distinguish goods from 
one manufacturer or merchant from those of another.65 Due to their 
broad, historical role as source identifiers from antiquity to common 
law and their fundamental roots in tort law, trademarks today 
intrinsically protect certain interests of both the producer and the 
consumer.66 Both parties are protected under one mark, although the 
                                                   
 59. LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 1.01. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. From the logos on popular running shoes—perhaps the Nike 
swoosh or the Adidas three stripes—to the coffee picked up on the way to work or 
school—such as the Starbucks word mark and accompanying mermaid design—to the 
characteristic color of the insulation in homes—like Owens Corning’s pink fiberglass 
insulation—trademarks can be found virtually everywhere. See id. at § 1.02; Trade 
Dress: The Forgotten Trademark Right, FINDLAW, http://corporate.findlaw.com/ 
intellectual-property/trade-dress-the-forgotten-trademark-right.html  
[http://perma.cc/4J2L-UTDG] (last visited Oct. 22, 2018). 
 62. See LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 1.06[1] (highlighting the history of 
trademark protection). 
 63. See MENELL, supra note 26, at 867 (“[T]here has been nothing in 
trademark law analogous to the desire to encourage invention or creation . . . . There 
is no explicit federal policy to encourage the creation of more trademarks.”). 
 64. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have power . . . [t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to 
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries . . . .”). 
 65. See LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 1.03[1]. 
 66. See id.; see also MENELL, supra note 26, at 867 (noting that the 
fundamental principles of trademark law reside in tort concepts of unfair competition 
and consumer deception). 
 Awarding Profits in Trademark Infringement Actions 803 
ownership of the mark is granted solely to the producer;67 however, 
rationales for why such protection is necessary or desirable are not 
inherently clear and have instead been posited by historians, scholars, 
and practitioners.68  
1. Setting the Basis: Origins of Trademark Protection 
The origins of trademarks trace back to at least 3500 B.C. when 
Egyptian artisans used scratchy signatures to signify to customers that 
they were the creators of clay-fired pots, tools, and building materials; 
the artisans could then be linked to the quality and reliability of their 
craftsmanship.69 The Etruscans, a race that preceded the founding of 
Rome by hundreds of years, used similar signatory marks on 
intricately decorated cups, plates, and vases.70 Identifying marks were 
also used extensively in ancient Roman society in the seventh and 
sixth centuries B.C. on medicines, ointments, wine, cheese, cloth, clay 
pottery, metal ornaments, and glass vessels—playing much the same 
role as trademarks do in commerce today.71 The rise of organized 
groups of artisans known as “guilds” in the fourteenth century led to 
the use of a compulsory system of production marks to distinguish the 
works of individual guild members.72 This system was designed to 
ensure that defective guild-associated products bought by consumers 
could be traced back to the individual manufacturer, who could then 
                                                   
 67. See MENELL ET AL., supra note 26, at 867 n.1 (“These are two very 
different interests held by different parties, both protected by a trademark granted to 
one of the parties.”). 
 68. See id. Unlike patents or copyrights, which have a Constitutional basis 
and directive, trademark functions have developed organically. See id. 
 69. See LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 1.06[1] (“Through his mark, a scratchy 
form of commercial signature, the potter could be identified with the quality of his 
craftsmanship by all who saw his work.”); Gerald Ruston, On the Origin of 
Trademarks, 45 TRADEMARK REP. 127, 128 (1955) (noting that these types of 
“scratchy marks” might even be present as early as approximately 5,000 B.C. on 
stone-age pottery). 
 70. See Ruston, supra note 69, at 131-32. 
 71. See id. at 132-33; see also Edward S. Rogers, Some Historical Matter 
Concerning Trade-Marks, 62 TRADEMARK REP. 239, 240 (1972) (“Wherever exist 
relics of Roman life, from Syria to Britain are found the names of workmen, of 
manufacturers and of traders, pictorial marks, marks of local origin and 
chronograms.”). 
 72. See LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 1.06[1]. The rise of guilds later led to 
“to registration systems for marks used by individual guild members.” Id. There are 
also records of the guild systems setting penalties for infringement during the Middle 
Ages. See id. 
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be punished criminally or through police regulations.73 Records from 
this time period also indicate that infringers in both France and the 
Holy Roman Empire were subject to harsh penalties, even including 
death.74 Historically, the concept that trademark law is designed to 
protect the consumer can trace its roots back to these medieval guilds 
and royal decrees of punishment for defective manufacturing.75 
Building on the trademark system developed in medieval times, 
common law cases in Great Britain have contributed heavily to 
modern trademark law jurisprudence, including the creation of 
provisions designed to protect producers.76 The basic ideas behind 
injunctive relief for trademark infringement can be traced directly to 
the landmark common law decision of Millington v. Fox in 1838.77 In 
Millington, the plaintiff had long used a specific trademark on steel 
products and alleged the defendant was using the same mark on his 
own steel goods in an attempt to pass them off as the plaintiff’s.78 The 
English Court of Equity acknowledged that an injunction was proper 
to enforce the plaintiff’s valid title to his trademark when another was 
using the mark unlawfully.79 The court allowed the injunction even 
though the defendant’s infringement of the mark did not appear to be 
willful; there was no proof the defendant intended to defraud, and the 
defendant was actually unaware that the plaintiff even owned the 
                                                   
 73. See Rogers, supra note 71, at 247. Use of marks in this manner helped to 
ensure only high-quality goods were produced by guild members and also allowed 
easy exclusion of goods from rival or neighboring guilds. See id. 
 74. See id. at 243-44 (noting that a French royal edict in 1564 “placed [mark] 
imitators . . . in the same category as counterfeiters who were punished capitally”). 
Marks were regarded as property in France, and edicts directly from the King required 
marks to be placed on locally important products, such as tapestries, as a protectionist 
measure; violations of these edicts were therefore punished “in the barbarous manner 
characteristic of the times.” Id. at 243. 
 75. See id. at 250 (“[M]ost of the provisions of our modern trade mark 
statutes and many of the common law rules on the subject are to be found in 
surprisingly similar form in the mediaeval guild regulations, municipal ordinances 
and royal decrees.”). 
 76. See LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 1.06[2] (noting that Sandford’s Case in 
1584 served as “the bridge sought by legal scholars, between trademark regulation by 
the medieval English trade guilds and the birth of modern trademark jurisprudence in 
the common law courts of the nineteenth century”). Sandford’s Case has “remarkable 
parallels to a twentieth-century case of intentional trademark infringement.” Id.  
 77. See id. (noting that Millington v. Fox was later cited by the United States 
Supreme Court for principles relating to injunctive relief—such principles are still 
followed today). 
 78. See id.  
 79. See id. (“[C]iting no authorities, [the Court of Equity] held that plaintiff 
‘undoubtedly had a right to the assistance of a Court of Equity to enforce that title.’” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
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mark.80 These historical uses of trademarks and trademark-like 
notations set the baseline for modern theories of trademark protection 
designed to protect both consumers and producers.  
2. Modern Theories: Protecting Producer Interests  
Modern trademark protection plays an important role in 
safeguarding the interests of producers—especially as trademarks 
continue to grow in importance as intangible assets for businesses.81 
Just as in early British common law cases like Millington, the source-
designation function of trademarks is crucial for producers and 
ultimately forms the touchstone of traditional trademark theory.82 The 
ability of a producer to link its own product to its trademark protects 
against consumer confusion over the product’s source.83 A lack of 
consumer confusion, in turn, benefits producers because consumer 
confusion can result in a diversion of trade to another producer 
through a misrepresentation of source, even if the misrepresentation is 
innocent.84 If a consumer purchases goods because he or she believes 
the goods are actually from a different producer, that producer has lost 
a probable sale.85 For example, if a consumer sets out to purchase an 
IBM computer and believes one of Griffin’s computers is actually 
from IBM, IBM has lost that consumer’s sale.86 
Diversion of trade is not the only danger resulting from 
consumer confusion.87 If a customer is confused about the source of 
goods and ends up purchasing the infringing product, any defects or 
dissatisfaction with the infringer’s product will be misattributed to the 
senior producer.88 For instance, if a consumer purchases a Griffin 
                                                   
 80. See id. 
 81. See Stonefield, supra note 40 (noting the importance of trademarks as 
intangible business assets in modern society). 
 82. See, e.g., Denicola, supra note 6, at 160 (explaining that consumer 
confusion due to misrepresentation of source results in a diversion of trade, thus 
injuring the producer); LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 1.06[1]. 
 83. See Denicola, supra note 6, at 160, 162. 
 84. See id. at 160 (“The law of trademarks . . . has its roots in the common 
law action of deceit. The gravamen of the complaint was that the defendant had 
fraudulently marketed goods by utilizing an imitation of the plaintiff’s trademark. 
Injury to the aggrieved trademark owner was direct: diversion of trade through a 
misrepresentation of the source of defendant’s merchandise.”). 
 85. See id.  
 86. See generally id.  
 87. See id. at 163 (“But there is an additional threat inherent in such 
circumstances: if the consumer remains mistaken about the origin of the products 
purchased from the infringer, any subsequent dissatisfaction will be at the expense of 
the senior user’s reputation and good will.”). 
 88. See id. 
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computer system believing that it is an IBM or is affiliated with IBM, 
but the computer subsequently falls apart within a month, the 
consumer’s dissatisfaction will be misattributed to IBM.89 IBM will 
thus suffer damage to its reputation as a reliable producer of state-of-
the-art electronics.90 Therefore, trademark protection allows for 
producers to retain control over the reputation and “goodwill” of the 
mark.91 The availability of trademark policing and the remedies 
available to dissuade trademark infringement and dilution protect a 
producer’s investment in the mark.92 This investment includes the 
monetary and time investment in the creation and advertising of a 
mark, the advertising of the product associated with the mark, and the 
implementation of other product-related investments, such as high-
quality materials, equipment, and quality assurance.93  
Furthermore, trademark protection provides producers with 
economic gain when consumers can identify the producer’s mark with 
higher quality.94 Once a reputation for quality is created, repeat 
purchasers and word-of-mouth references generate higher sales; 
consumers are more likely to pay greater sums for goods they can 
easily and quickly identify as higher quality.95 For example, if 
consumers commonly know that Apple products are of high quality, 
they will generally be willing to pay higher prices.96 However, free 
                                                   
 89. See generally id.  
 90. See generally id. 
 91. See id. at 163. “Goodwill” is often defined as the inherent value of a 
trademark and is tied to consumer recognition of and associations with the mark in 
conjunction with the extra revenue the mark generates. See Charles Internicola, What 
Is Trademark Goodwill?, INTERNICOLA L. FIRM (Aug. 29, 2010), 
https://www.franchiselawsolutions.com/blog/what-is-trademark-goodwill 
[https://perma.cc/9ZRJ-YC82]. 
 92. See MENELL, supra note 26, at 867-68 (“Trademark 
‘ownership[]’ . . . essentially begins as something like a legal fiction that gives the 
trademark owner a cause of action he would not otherwise have . . . .”). 
 93. See id. at 868 (“Giving the originator of a mark the right to police 
counterfeiting also serves to protect [various] types of investment . . . .”). 
 94. See Landes & Posner, supra note 36, at 270. But see Jeremy N. Sheff, 
Biasing Brands, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1245, 1245 (2011) (positing that the economic 
search costs model of trademark law is influenced by brand bias to the point where it 
is only efficient when paired with certain mandated government regulations that 
mitigate producers’ ability to manipulate consumer psychology, which does not 
currently exist). 
 95. See Landes & Posner, supra note 36, at 270 (“Once the reputation is 
created, the firm will obtain greater profits because repeat purchases and word-of-
mouth references will generate higher sales and because consumers will be willing to 
pay higher prices for lower search costs and greater assurance of consistent quality.”). 
 96. See generally id. 
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riding can easily destroy any economic incentive to invest in a mark.97 
A free-riding infringer can easily, and at little cost, leech off the 
goodwill of a strong trademark because some consumers will assume 
that the infringer’s goods are also of high quality—eventually 
destroying the “capital” invested in the mark.98 Adequate protection of 
trademarks is therefore necessary to protect both the goodwill of 
existing marks and the incentive to invest in the goodwill of marks in 
the future.99 
3. Modern Theories: Protecting Consumer Interests 
Trademarks are incredibly prevalent in modern society, and by 
broadly acting as an identifier of the source of a product, they also play 
an important role in protecting the consumer’s interests.100 First and 
foremost, trademarks allow consumers to distinguish goods from one 
manufacturer from those of another, preventing a likelihood of 
consumer confusion as to source designation—consumers know when 
they are purchasing an IBM product versus a Griffin product.101 This 
function also prevents consumers from being deceived¾for example, 
purchasing a competitor’s inferior or defective product thinking it is 
from another producer.102 Although consumers lack standing to sue 
under the Lanham Act, the right of the consumer to purchase the 
desired good without being deceived is still one of the primary 
protections underlying trademark law.103 Put simply, trademark law 
follows the long-entrenched tort-based policy that the court has an 
                                                   
 97. See id. (“If the law does not prevent it, free riding will eventually destroy 
the information capital embodied in a trademark, and the prospect of free riding may 
therefore eliminate the incentive to develop a valuable trademark in the first place.”). 
 98. See id. (“The free-riding competitor will, at little cost, capture some of 
the profits associated with a strong trademark because some consumers will assume 
(at least in the short run) that the free rider’s and the original trademark holder’s 
brands are identical.”). 
 99. See id.  
 100. See, e.g., LALONDE, supra note 2, at §§ 1.03[1], [6] (“[A] trademark [] is 
accorded legal protection when it designates the source or origin of a product or 
service so as to distinguish that product or service from the products or services of 
others . . . .”). 
 101. See, e.g., Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark 
Protection, 60 TRADEMARK REP. 334, 338 (1970); see also LALONDE, supra note 2, at 
§ 5.01[3][a] (“[T]he ‘likelihood of confusion’ inquiry centers on whether members of 
the purchasing public are likely to believe that defendants’ products or services come 
from the same source as plaintiffs’ protected products or services.”).  
 102. See Schechter, supra note 101, at 338 (“The protection of trademarks 
originated as a police measure to prevent ‘the grievous deceit of the people’ by the 
sale of defective goods . . . .” (internal citations omitted)). 
 103. See LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 1.03[6][a].  
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overriding duty to protect the public; here specifically, the court has a 
duty to protect the public from confusion and deceit by enjoining the 
use of infringing trademarks.104  
Similarly, trademarks guarantee consumers a certain level of 
consistency in the quality or other attributes associated with a brand 
or mark.105 A consumer can thus walk into a store, pick up a product, 
and generally know the attributes of the product from the product’s 
trademark.106 Trademarks, therefore, also play a role in economic 
efficiency for the consumer who benefits from the concise and quick 
facts about a product that can be identified simply by seeing a 
trademark or brand.107 For instance, if a consumer knows he or she 
would like to purchase Apple’s latest portable electronic cellular 
device with the screen that stretches the entirety of the device’s face, 
it is much more efficient—quicker, shorter, and easier to remember—
for the consumer to simply ask for an “iPhone X.”108 
The rationales of trademark protection have developed over 
thousands of years and countless societies.109 From Egyptian artisans 
to the modern centerpieces of billion-dollar companies, trademarks 
have evolved to protect the interests of both the consumer and the 
producer.110 These beneficial functions of trademarks reduce consumer 
confusion and deception, incentivize investment, and promote 
economic efficiency, but these benefits are undermined when 
                                                   
 104. See id. This general, overreaching policy is also evidenced by anti-
counterfeiting laws, anti-cybersquatting provisions, and unfair competition laws 
designed to protect consumers. See id.; MENELL, supra note 26, at 867 
(“[F]undamental principles of trademark law have essentially been . . . unfair 
competition and the tort of deception of the consumer.”). 
 105. See In re XMH Corp., 647 F.3d 690, 695-96 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 106. See id. (“A trademark is a shorthand designation of a brand. It conveys 
information that allows the consumer to say to himself, ‘I need not investigate the 
attributes of the product I am about to purchase because the trademark is a shorthand 
way of telling me that the attributes are the same as that of the like-branded product I 
enjoyed earlier.’”).  
 107. See Landes & Posner, supra note 36, at 268-69 (“The benefit of the brand 
name is analogous to that of designating individuals by last as well as first names, so 
that, instead of having to say ‘the Geoffrey who teaches constitutional law at the 
University of Chicago Law School—not the one who teaches corporations,’ you can 
say ‘Geoffrey Stone—not Geoffrey Miller.’”). 
 108. See id. Landes and Posner make a similar analogy to a consumer asking 
in a retail store for “decaffeinated coffee made by General Foods” versus simply 
asking for “Sanka,” which is shorter to say, requires you to remember less, and 
requires the waiter or clerk to remember and read less. Id. 
 109. See, e.g., LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 1.06[1]; Ruston, supra note 69, at 
128-41. 
 110. See, e.g., LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 1.06[1]; MENELL, supra note 26, 
at 867; Ruston, supra note 69, at 128-41.  
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infringement is not adequately deterred.111 In the United States, the 
Lanham Act chiefly protects the beneficial functions of trademarks.112 
However, courts have not been able to fully agree on the interpretation 
of certain aspects of the Lanham Act’s remedies provision—which 
can deter infringing conduct.113 
II. THE LANHAM ACT AND THE INITIAL WILLFULNESS CIRCUIT 
SPLIT: COURT DECISIONS PRIOR TO THE 1999 AMENDMENT 
The Lanham Act was passed in 1946 and governs federal 
trademark law in the United States.114 The circuit splits involving the 
awarding of the defendant’s profits in an infringement action focus on 
the wording in the remedies provision of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1117.115 
Although the context and specific reasoning in each of the two circuit 
splits differ, the main dispute has remained the same—whether 
willfulness is required to award a plaintiff an infringing defendant’s 
profits.116 Unfortunately, the initial circuit split left many questions 
unanswered that remain unanswered to this day.117  
A. The Lanham Act and Relevant Amendments 
Both sides of the circuit split on the award of profits in a 
trademark infringement action find their roots in the wording of the 
Lanham Act and its amendments.118 Trademark protection in the 
United States is “multi-layered” and is regulated by federal statutory 
law, state statutory law, and common law.119 Congress exercised the 
                                                   
 111. See LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 1.06[1]; Landes & Posner, supra note 
36, at 269-70 (explaining, for example, how free-riding destroys the incentive for 
companies to invest in a mark). 
 112. See LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 1.04[2] (describing the Lanham Act and 
its operative sections). 
 113. See, e.g., Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 875 F.3d 426, 
439-42 (9th Cir. 2017) (describing the history of the disagreement over the remedies 
portion of the Lanham Act); see also Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 941 
(7th Cir. 1989) (outlining the justifications, including deterrence, for certain aspects 
of the remedies provision). 
 114. See LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 1.04. 
 115. See Stone Creek, 875 F.3d at 439-42. 
 116. See id.  
 117. See id. 
 118. See id. at 439 (“The evolution of the remedies provision [of the Lanham 
Act]—including the ever-persisting circuit split—is key to understanding the impact 
of the 1999 amendment . . . .”). 
 119. See LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 1.04 (“The Lanham Act applies at the 
federal level, and both the common law of unfair competition and a network of 
statutory laws apply at the state level. Although federal and state trademark laws 
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power granted to it under the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution and passed the Lanham Act in 1946 to cover federal 
trademark registration, trademark infringement actions, and 
associated remedies.120 Remedies available under the Lanham Act for 
a violation of trademark-related rights, such as infringement via a 
likelihood of confusion, are described in 15 U.S.C. § 1117.121 This 
provision allows, “subject to the principles of equity,” the plaintiff to 
recover the profits obtained by the defendant, damages sustained by 
the plaintiff, and the costs of the action.122 However, the Lanham Act 
does not define the “subject to the principles of equity” language, 
leaving courts to decide whether the “principles of equity” dictate that 
they treat willful and non-willful infringers the same for the purpose 
of determining remedies—thus creating the first of two circuit splits 
related to the remedies portion of the Act.123  
Courts have, however, generally been able to agree that “willful” 
infringement necessitates a bad faith intent to deceive consumers, 
rather than an attempt to imitate the successful features of a 
competitor’s product or mark.124 A deliberate attempt to incorporate 
                                                   
overlap to a great extent, federal law is not ordinarily held to displace or pre-empt 
state law except where a conflict arises between the two.”). Furthermore, state law 
infringement actions are generally resolved under the same standards that are applied 
in federal court. See id. 
 120. See id. The Lanham Act was an “overhaul [of] the antiquated 1905 
Trademark Act.” Id. Because the Lanham Act was enacted under Commerce Clause 
power, “[c]ontact with interstate commerce is thus required throughout the Act. For 
example, a trademark must be used in such commerce before it may be registered 
federally, and an infringer must commit its infringing acts in or affecting such 
commerce before they become actionable under the Act.” Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1051(a) (2012). 
 121. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2012).  
 122. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (1996) (“When a violation of any right of the 
registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a violation under 
section 1125(a) of this title, shall have been established in any civil action arising 
under this chapter, the plaintiff shall be entitled, subject to the provisions of sections 
1111 and 1114 of this title, and subject to the principles of equity, to recover (1) 
defendant’s profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the 
action.”). 
 123. See Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 875 F.3d 426, 440 
(9th Cir. 2017) (“The spirited debate among the circuits has been reserved for how 
the phrase ‘subject to the principles of equity’ applies to an award of the defendant’s 
profits.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 124. See George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532, 1541 (2d Cir. 
1992). In George Basch, the court specifically notes that “[t]here is an ‘essential 
distinction . . . between a deliberate attempt to deceive and a deliberate attempt to 
compete. Absent confusion, imitation of certain successful features in another’s 
product is not unlawful and to that extent a ‘free ride’ is permitted.’” Id. (quoting 
Norwick Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 271 F.2d 569, 572 (2d Cir. 1959)). 
However, courts such as the Ninth Circuit have held that choosing a designation with 
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successful features of another’s mark to compete in the market, even 
if confusion occurs, is not considered willful infringement.125 The 
difference between the conduct of Griffin and Cerberus illustrates the 
distinction.126 Griffin took the successful features from others’ marks 
in an attempt to compete in the market and inadvertently crossed the 
line into infringement; therefore, the infringement is not considered 
willful.127 Cerberus intended to deceive consumers from the start by 
knowingly and intentionally making its logo confusingly similar to the 
Apple logo, and therefore, the infringement is considered willful.128 
Awarding the plaintiff profits obtained by the defendant through use 
of the infringing mark has historically been justified on different 
grounds, including principles of unjust enrichment, deterrence, and 
compensation.129 The Lanham Act also specifically notes that the 
available remedies, including lost profits, shall not constitute a penalty 
and must only serve as compensation.130  
In 1996, Congress substantively amended the Lanham Act to 
create a federal cause of action for trademark dilution, codified in 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(c).131 Trademark dilution differs from trademark 
infringement in that it functions chiefly to protect against the loss of 
                                                   
knowledge it is another’s trademark permits an assumption of intent to deceive. See 
Stone Creek, 875 F.3d at 434 (citing Hokto Kinoko Co. v. Concord Farms, Inc., 738 
F.3d 1085, 1096 (9th Cir. 2013)). 
 125. See George Basch, 968 F.2d at 1541 (“Of course, even when a likelihood 
of confusion does arise, that does not inexorably lead to the conclusion that the 
defendant acted with deliberate deceit. Depending upon the circumstances, consumer 
confusion might as easily result from an innocent competitor who inadvertently 
crosses the line between a ‘free ride’ and liability, as it could from a defendant’s 
intentionally fraudulent conduct.”). 
 126. See id. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 941 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(“Profits are awarded under different rationales including unjust enrichment, 
deterrence, and compensation.”). But see Rachel Anne Zisek, Note, Where There’s a 
Will, There’s a Way: Reconciling Theories of Willful Infringement and Disgorgement 
Damages in Trademark Law, 22 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 463, 486-87 (2015) (echoing that 
awarding profits has been justified on the three aforementioned grounds, but further 
arguing that deterrence may only serve—or would better serve—to deter future 
conduct of willful infringers but not innocent infringers). 
 130. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012) (“Such sum in either of the above 
circumstances shall constitute compensation and not a penalty.”). 
 131. See Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 875 F.3d 426, 440-
41 (9th Cir. 2017); see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2012) (“Subject to the principles 
of equity, the owner of a famous mark that is distinctive . . . shall be entitled to an 
injunction against another person who, at any time after the owner’s mark has become 
famous, commences use of a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause 
dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the 
presence or absence of actual or likely confusion . . . .”). 
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distinctiveness or uniqueness of famous marks, even if other uses of 
the mark would not be confusing.132 Trademark infringement under 
§ 1117, on the other hand, is only actionable when there is a likelihood 
of confusion between the marks.133 The 1898 British case Eastman 
Kodak Co. v. Kodak Cycle Co. exhibits an early example of the 
dilution principle.134 There, the court allowed the famous Kodak film 
company to stop the Kodak bike company from using the Kodak mark 
even though consumers knew the two entities were distinct and made 
separate types of products.135 The court reasoned that the Kodak film 
company could suffer harm regardless of the lack of confusion due to 
a loss of distinctiveness of its mark.136 Allowing the same mark to 
represent two different companies and their associated products would 
“dilute” and weaken the distinctiveness of Kodak’s famous brand in 
the minds of consumers.137 
When Congress added the dilution provision to the Lanham Act, 
it initially failed to cross-reference the cause of action for trademark 
dilution to the remedies provision of the Act.138 It subsequently 
amended the remedies provision of the Lanham Act in 1999 to fix the 
mismatch and thus made it clear that a plaintiff bringing a trademark 
dilution claim could recover the same damages that would be available 
in trademark infringement actions.139 However, when Congress 
amended the statute, it added that a willful violation of the dilution 
provision would entitle the plaintiff to remedies, but it did not 
                                                   
 132. See MENELL, supra note 26, at 1030-31. The concept of trademark 
dilution originated with practitioner Frank Schechter and attempts to protect against 
famous marks “inevitably be[ing] lost in the commonplace words of language, despite 
the originality and ingenuity in their contrivance, and the vast expenditures in 
advertising them which the courts concede should be protected to the same extent as 
plant and machinery.” Id. at 1031; see also 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). 
 133. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117. 
 134. See MENELL, supra note 26, at 1030-31.  
 135. See id. 
 136. See id. 
 137. See LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 5A.01[2] (“If the allegedly diluting 
trademark lessens the distinctiveness of the famous mark—in other words, if it 
reduces or weakens the mark’s ability to indicate the source of goods—there is a 
violation of Section 43(c).”). 
 138. See Stone Creek, 875 F.3d at 440 (“But Congress failed to make the 
requisite cross-reference in § 1117(a) to harmonize that section with the amendment 
and soon discovered the missing link between the two statutory provisions.”). 
 139. See id. at 440-41 (“When a violation of any right of the registrant of a 
mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, a violation under section 1125(a) 
or (d) of this title, or a willful violation under [the dilution provision], shall have been 
established in any civil action arising under this chapter, the plaintiff shall be entitled, 
subject to the provisions of sections 1111 and 1114 of this title, and subject to the 
principles of equity, to recover (1) defendant’s profits, (2) any damages sustained by 
the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action.” (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012))). 
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otherwise modify any other existing language—thus leaving 
unanswered the applicability of the willfulness requirement in 
likelihood of confusion-based trademark infringement actions.140 The 
1999 amendment caused further confusion among the courts and 
renewed the previous circuit split that had yet to be resolved.141 To 
date, the Supreme Court has not weighed in on the willfulness 
requirement for awarding profits in infringement actions.142 
B. The Initial Circuit Split 
The enigmatic “subject to the principles of equity” wording in 
the pre-1999 Lanham Act created the preliminary division among the 
federal courts of appeals on the willfulness requirement.143 The courts 
wrestled as to whether “the principles of equity” required a showing 
of willful infringement when awarding a defendant’s profits in 
likelihood of confusion-based infringement actions.144 Two “camps” 
ultimately emerged¾those that absolutely required a showing of 
willfulness and those that “viewed willfulness as one factor in the 
overall determination of whether an award of profits is appropriate.”145 
With some limited exceptions, circuits generally relied upon previous 
precedent within the circuit and remained firmly entrenched in one 
camp or another until the 1999 amendment was passed, which then 
necessitated a fresh look at the issue.146 
1. Circuits Requiring a Showing of Willfulness  
The first camp in the pre-1999 Lanham Act circuit split required 
a showing of willfulness to award a defendant’s profits to the plaintiff 
                                                   
 140. See id. Thus, the statute references (1) a violation under the infringement 
provision and (2) a willful violation under the dilution provision. See id. 
 141. See id.  
 142. See Turner & Ball, supra note 30 (“As Stone Creek deepens the divide 
among circuits, the issue of whether willfulness is required for disgorgement of a 
defendant’s profits in trademark cases is ripe for Supreme Court review.”). 
 143. See Stone Creek, 875 F.3d at 439-40. 
 144. See id. (“The spirited debate among the circuits has been reserved for 
how the phrase ‘subject to the principles of equity’ applies to an award of the 
defendant’s profits.”).  
 145. Id. at 440. 
 146. See generally Danielle Conway-Jones, Remedying Trademark 
Infringement: The Role of Bad Faith in Awarding an Accounting of Defendant’s 
Profits, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 863, 889-90 (2002); see also Stone Creek, 875 F.3d 
at 442 (noting the “entrenched circuit split on willfulness” and that the Ninth Circuit 
is “well-settled” on the willfulness requirement). 
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in a trademark infringement action.147 These circuits opted for a bright-
line rule rather than a multi-factor approach.148 This camp ultimately 
included the Second Circuit, Third Circuit, Ninth Circuit, and District 
of Columbia Circuit.149  
At one point, scholars regarded the Second Circuit as perhaps 
the biggest proponent of the bright-line rule.150 Second Circuit 
jurisprudence has long advocated the willfulness requirement in 
trademark infringement actions, possibly dating back to 1965 in 
Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Perfect Fit Products Manufacturing.151 In 
more recent cases prior to the 1999 amendment, the Second Circuit 
articulated its concern that awarding profits in the absence of 
willfulness, including under a multi-factor approach, could lead to an 
excessively harsh, “draconian” result.152 Unlike an accounting of the 
plaintiff’s lost profits—which are generally computed as part of the 
plaintiff’s overall damages and actually measure harm to the 
plaintiff—the defendant’s profits measure not the plaintiff’s loss, but 
the defendant’s gain.153 Thus, remedies based on the defendant’s 
profits tend to overcompensate for a plaintiff’s actual injury, creating 
a windfall judgment for the plaintiff at the defendant’s expense.154 For 
example, if IBM has $1 million in damages due to Griffin’s non-
willful infringement, and Griffin gains $500,000 in profits non-
willfully using the infringing mark, IBM would be able to recover $1.5 
million, despite an “actual injury” of only $1 million.155  
                                                   
 147. See Conway-Jones, supra note 146, at 907-08. 
 148. See id. 
 149. See id. at 907; see also Stone Creek, 875 F.3d at 439-40. 
 150. See Conway-Jones, supra note 146, at 907-08 (“Spearheading the 
movement toward a bright line rule for recovery of an accounting is the Second 
Circuit.”); see also George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532, 1539-40 (2d 
Cir. 1992) (“In view of this, the American Law Institute has recently concluded that 
a finding of willful infringement is the necessary catalyst for the disgorgement of ill-
gotten profits. . . . We agree.”). 
 151. See Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Perfect Fit Prods. Mfg., 349 F.2d 389, 390-
93 (2d Cir. 1965). The court in Monsanto affirmed the holding on the defendant’s 
willful infringement and an award of profits, but it did not directly state that a recovery 
was dependent on a bad faith showing. See id. However, it was likely “presumed.” 
Conway-Jones, supra note 146, at 909. 
 152. George Basch, 968 F.2d at 1540 (“[W]e believe that this requirement is 
necessary to avoid the conceivably draconian impact that a profits remedy might have 
in some cases.”).  
 153. See id. (“While damages directly measure the plaintiff’s loss, defendant’s 
profits measure the defendant’s gain . . . [o]f course, this is not to be confused with 
plaintiff’s lost profits, which have been traditionally compensable as an element of 
plaintiff’s damages.”). 
 154. See id.  
 155. See generally id.  
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On these principles, the Second Circuit reasoned that a windfall 
judgment at an innocent or good faith defendant’s expense was 
inequitable and therefore inconsistent with the wording of the Lanham 
Act in George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., a case of alleged trade 
dress infringement of metal polish cans.156 The Second Circuit ruled 
that the district court erred in awarding George Basch the profits 
obtained by Blue Coral because Blue Coral had no intent to deceive 
consumers or violate George Basch’s rights with its metal polish can; 
rather, Blue Coral only intended to “compete” in the market, so the 
infringement was therefore not considered willful.157 The Second 
Circuit decided that a higher burden for trademark owners to 
demonstrate entitlement to monetary relief, such as showing willful 
infringement, was required for compliance with the “principles of 
equity.”158  
The Third Circuit was one of the last circuits to weigh in on the 
issue prior to the enactment of the 1999 amendment, and like the 
Second Circuit, it decided that a bright-line test best fit with the 
principles of equity, but it offered only a cursory analysis as to why.159 
In SecuraComm Consulting Inc. v. Securacom Inc., the Third Circuit 
analyzed the district court’s award of profits to the plaintiff, 
SecuraComm Consulting, which the district court justified as a 
measure to deter the defendant’s misconduct for willfully infringing 
with its “Securacom” name.160 The Third Circuit reversed the district 
                                                   
 156. See id. at 1540 (noting that some “courts require proof of intentional 
misconduct” before allowing a plaintiff to recover a defendant’s profits to otherwise 
limit inequitable results). 
 157. Id. at 1541. The court specifically reasoned that there is an essential 
distinction between an attempt to deceive and an attempt to compete: “[I]mitation of 
certain successful features in another’s product is not unlawful and to that extent a 
‘free ride’ is permitted.” Id. (quoting Norwich Pharmacal Co. v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 
271 F.2d 569, 572 (2d Cir. 1959)). The court also noted that consumer confusion does 
not always equate to deceit (i.e., willful infringement). See id.  
 158. Conway-Jones, supra note 146, at 889. “By requiring the trademark 
owner to show . . . bad faith[,] . . . the Second Circuit increased the burden for 
trademark owners to demonstrate their entitlement to monetary relief . . . .” Id. at 912. 
 159. See Conway-Jones, supra note 146, at 917; see also SecuraComm 
Consulting Inc. v. Securacom Inc., 166 F.3d 182, 190 (3d Cir. 1999) (“[A] plaintiff 
must prove that an infringer acted willfully before the infringer’s profits are 
recoverable.”). 
 160. See SecuraComm, 166 F.3d at 189-90 (“The District Court concluded that 
an award of 10% of Securacom New Jersey’s profits for the years in question was 
appropriate to deter a willful infringer such as Securacom New Jersey from such acts 
in the future.”); see also SecuraComm Consulting v. Securacom Inc., 984 F. Supp. 
286, 303 (D.N.J. 1997) (“The rationale underlying [the deterrence theory] is not 
compensatory in nature, but rather seeks to protect the public at large. By awarding 
the profits of a bad faith infringer to the rightful owner of a mark, [the courts] promote 
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court’s award of profits because the infringement was not willful—
there was no evidence that Securacom knew it was copying 
SecuraComm Consulting’s mark.161 Chiefly, the court noted that a 
failure to conduct a trademark search for similar marks is not a 
sufficient basis to determine that infringement is willful, absent key 
facts that a search is specifically needed, such as evidence of 
knowledge of another using a similar name.162 Rounding out this camp 
is the District of Columbia Circuit, which followed the rulings and 
reasoning of the Second Circuit and offered only a cursory analysis of 
its own on the willfulness issue.163 
The lone circuit that waivered in its viewpoint and switched 
camps prior to the 1999 amendment was the Ninth Circuit.164 
Originally opting for a weighing of factors in 1979’s Faberge, Inc. v. 
Saxony Products, Inc. and in subsequent cases,165 the court’s opinion 
changed in Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp. in 1993, and it has 
remained in favor of the bright-line rule ever since.166 In Lindy Pen, 
                                                   
the secondary effect of deterring public fraud regarding the source and quality of 
consumer goods and services.”). 
 161. See SecuraComm, 166 F.3d at 190-91 (“In this case, however, the District 
Court awarded profits to deter defendant’s assertedly egregious misconduct; a 
plaintiff must prove that an infringer acted willfully before the infringer’s profits are 
recoverable. . . . Because the evidence in the record does not support the finding of 
willful infringement, we reverse the award of profits and attorneys’ fees.”). 
 162. See id. at 188-89 (“In the absence of these key details, it is unreasonable 
to conclude that Securacom New Jersey’s failure to conduct a trademark search 
established willful ignorance akin to willful infringement[,] . . . [it] was at most 
careless[,] . . . [a]nd carelessness is not the same as deliberate indifference with 
respect to another’s rights in a mark or a calculated attempt to benefit from another’s 
goodwill.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 163. See ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d 958, 968 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990) (“[A]n award based on a defendant’s profits requires proof that the 
defendant acted willfully or in bad faith.”); see also Conway-Jones, supra note 146, 
at 914-15 (noting that the District of Columbia Circuit followed the Second Circuit 
without discussing the three theories of recovery or the willfulness provision). 
 164. See Conway-Jones, supra note 146, at 894-99. 
 165. See Faberge, Inc. v. Saxony Products, Inc., 605 F.2d 426, 429 (9th Cir. 
1979) (“Willful infringement may support an award of profits to the plaintiff, but does 
not require one.”). 
 166. See Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 982 F.2d 1400, 1405-06 (9th Cir. 
1993) (“Where trademark infringement is deliberate and willful, this court has found 
that a remedy no greater than an injunction ‘slights’ the public. This standard applies, 
however, only in those cases where the infringement is ‘willfully calculated to exploit 
the advantage of an established mark.’ The intent of the infringer is relevant evidence 
on the issue of awarding profits and damages and the amount.” (internal citations 
omitted)). The Ninth Circuit later reaffirmed that the Lindy Pen holding was intended 
to require willfulness. See Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 875 F.3d 
426, 440 (9th Cir. 2017). Paradoxically, in both Faberge and Lindy Pen the Ninth 
Circuit cited the same case as its basis for the decision despite reaching opposite 
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both the Lindy Pen Company and Bic Pen Corporation used the word 
“auditor’s” on the barrels of various pen models, but Lindy held 
superior rights to the mark.167 Finding a likelihood of confusion, the 
lower court refused, however, to award Lindy an award of Bic’s 
profits on pens using the “auditor’s” mark.168 The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the lower court’s holding, simply stating that profits must be 
granted in light of equitable considerations, and equity dictates that 
the plaintiff must show the defendant’s actions were accompanied by 
intent, which Lindy could not show.169 The adherence of the Second, 
Third, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits to a bright-line rule 
starkly contrasted the remaining circuits’ flexible, equity-based 
balancing approach to willfulness in infringement actions.170 
2. Circuits Using Willfulness as a Factor in the Determination 
The second camp in the original willfulness circuit split 
determined that a showing of willfulness was just one of many factors 
to consider in weighing whether a court can order the plaintiff an 
award of the defendant’s profits in a trademark infringement action.171 
This camp consisted of the Fifth Circuit and Seventh Circuit.172 
Although their specific reasoning differed, the rationale of both 
circuits primarily reflected an attempt to “balance equities” rather than 
use a bright-line rule.173  
                                                   
results. See Lindy Pen, 982 F.2d at 1405; Faberge, 605 F.2d at 429 (citing Maier 
Brewing Co. v. Fleischmann Distilling Corp., 390 F.2d 117, 121 (9th Cir. 1968)). At 
least one commentator has noted that the Ninth Circuit’s decision to shift away from 
the factor-based approach appeared to be inadvertent due to a misreading of the 
Lanham Act, but this now seems unlikely due to the Ninth Circuit’s steadfast 
adherence to the bright-line approach in all recent cases. See Conway-Jones, supra 
note 146, at 896-97; see also Stone Creek, 875 F.3d at 439. 
 167. See Lindy Pen, 982 F.2d at 1403-04. 
 168. See id.  
 169. See Stone Creek, 875 F.3d at 440 (noting that in Lindy Pen, the Ninth 
Circuit “held that an award of the defendant’s profits ‘is not automatic and must be 
granted in light of equitable considerations’; equity dictates that the plaintiff must 
show that the defendant’s infringing acts were accompanied by some form of intent” 
(quoting Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 982 F.2d 1400, 1405-06 (9th Cir. 1993))).  
 170. See id.  
 171. See id. (noting that the second camp included circuits that viewed 
willfulness “as one factor in the overall determination of whether an award of profits 
is appropriate”). 
 172. See id.  
 173. See Conway-Jones, supra note 146, at 889-90 (“[W]hether expressed or 
implied, analytical or conclusory, fair or inequitable, these decisions reflect a judicial 
attempt to balance various factors, as opposed to applying a bright line rule, to 
determine the appropriateness of the award of the accounting remedy.”). 
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Early on, the Seventh Circuit in Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co. 
directly addressed the question of awarding a defendant’s profits and 
the willfulness requirement.174 Although the court’s discussion of the 
subject was brief, it dismissed the idea that there were any specific, 
determinative requirements or factors to justify an award of profits 
beyond “general equitable considerations.”175 Thus, the court held that 
a showing of willfulness was not required to award profits.176 For 
example, in Roulo, the Seventh Circuit felt it was appropriate to award 
Roulo Russ Berrie’s profits because of evidence of “intentional 
imitation” of Roulo’s greeting cards, although not with an intent to 
deceive, and substantial similarities of the goods.177 The trial court’s 
primary function in a trademark infringement case is to make it 
unprofitable to violate the Lanham Act.178 In order to accomplish this 
objective, the Seventh Circuit, in Ruolo, decided it must have the 
latitude to award damages sufficient to deter violations.179  
The Fifth Circuit also refused to adopt the bright-line rule 
advocated by a majority of the circuits.180 Since as early as 1980, the 
Fifth Circuit has utilized a factor-based approach for awarding the 
defendant’s profits in infringement actions, but it was not until the 
1998 case Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd. that the court applied its 
                                                   
 174. See Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 941 (7th Cir. 1989). 
 175. Id. (“The Lanham Act specifically provides for the awarding of profits in 
the discretion of the judge subject only to principles of equity. . . . Other than general 
equitable considerations, there is no express requirement that the parties be in direct 
competition or that the infringer wilfully [sic] infringe the trade dress to justify an 
award of profits.”). The defendant in Roulo contended that the district court should 
have directed a verdict against the recovery of profits because the plaintiff “failed to 
demonstrate any actual damages, confusion, competition between the parties or 
wilfulness [sic] on the part of [the defendant].” Id.  
 176. See id. 
 177. Id.  
 178. See id. (“The trial court’s primary function is to make violations of the 
Lanham Act unprofitable to the infringing party.” (quoting Otis Clapp & Son, Inc. v. 
Filmore Vitamin Co., 754 F.2d 738, 744 (7th Cir. 1985))). Additionally, the Seventh 
Circuit (and Ninth Circuit) have noted that: 
[A]n award of little more than nominal damages would encourage a 
counterfeiter to merely switch from one infringing scheme to another as 
soon as the infringed owner became aware of the fabrication. Such a method 
of enforcement would fail to serve as a convincing deterrent to the profit 
maximizing entrepreneur who engages in trademark piracy. 
Otis Clapp, 754 F.2d at 744 (quoting Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Baccarat Clothing Co., 
692 F.2d 1272, 1274 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
 179. See Roulo, 886 F.2d at 341. 
 180. See, e.g., Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 554-55 (5th 
Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, 
Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (abrogating Pebble Beach for reasons unrelated to this Note, 
specifically regarding the trademark functionality doctrine). 
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approach to a case potentially involving willful infringement.181 In this 
case involving copied golf course layouts and related service marks, 
the court emphasized that the appropriateness of awarding profits in a 
trademark infringement action needed to be determined on a case-by-
case basis through a weighing of factors.182 The test articulated in 
Pebble Beach listed “whether the defendant had the intent to confuse 
or deceive” to be weighed along with five other relevant, although not 
determinative or exhaustive, factors, including: the presence of 
diverted sales, the “adequacy” of other Lanham Act remedies, any 
delay in bringing the action, public interest considerations, and 
whether the action involved palming off.183 Defendant Tour 18 had a 
good-faith belief that it could copy plaintiff Pebble Beach’s course 
designs and related marks, and it did not divert sales or attempt to palm 
off Pebble Beach’s mark; thus, the district court’s denial of Pebble 
Beach’s demand for Tour 18’s profits was appropriate.184 
Even after decades of litigation, courts were not able to come to 
a consensus on the willfulness requirement in trademark infringement 
or even a consistent viewpoint on how to best interpret the “principles 
of equity.”185 Additionally, the Supreme Court never granted certiorari 
to clarify the matter.186 Thus, when Congress amended the Lanham Act 
in 1999, courts had to deal with the uncertainty of both the new 
amendment and the old, unresolved issues above.187 
                                                   
 181. See id. at 524, 544; see also Conway-Jones, supra note 146, at 899. 
 182. See Pebble Beach, 155 F.3d at 554-55.  
 183. Id. at 554. (“[R]elevant factors to the court’s determination of whether an 
award of profits is appropriate include, but are not limited to, . . . whether the 
defendant had the intent to confuse or deceive, . . . whether sales have been 
diverted, . . . the adequacy of other remedies, . . . any unreasonable delay by the 
plaintiff in asserting his rights, . . . the public interest in making the misconduct 
unprofitable, and . . . whether it is a case of palming off.”). Palming off occurs 
“[w]hen a party misrepresents its own products or services as those of a 
competitor. . . . If Defendant Dress Manufacturer sells its own dresses under the label 
of Plaintiff Dress Manufacturer, that is [palming] off.” LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 
7.02[b]. 
 184. See Pebble Beach, 155 F.3d at 555.  
 185. Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 875 F.3d 426, 439-40 
(9th Cir. 2017). 
 186. See, e.g., Lindy Pen Co. v. Bic Pen Corp., 982 F.2d 1400 (9th Cir. 1993), 
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 815 (1993); George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 
1532 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 991 (1992); Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 
886 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1075 (1990); see also Stone 
Creek, 875 F.3d at 439-40 (discussing the initial circuit split and implying that the 
Supreme Court never answered the willfulness question).  
 187. See Stone Creek, 875 F.3d at 439-42. 
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III. THE SECOND WILLFULNESS CIRCUIT SPLIT: DECISIONS 
FOLLOWING THE 1999 AMENDMENT 
The 1999 amendment to the Lanham Act renewed the debate and 
deepened the circuit split over whether awarding a defendant’s profits 
requires a showing of willful infringement.188 The amendment 
corrected a simple drafting error¾Congress initially failed to cross-
reference the new cause of action for trademark dilution to the 
remedies provision.189 The amendment thus connected the cause of 
action for trademark dilution to the recovery section of the Lanham 
Act—15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).190 With the amendment, Congress made it 
clear that a plaintiff bringing a dilution claim can recover damages, 
but based on the new, plain statutory language, this recovery can 
seemingly only occur when the violation is willful.191 This revision 
contrasts with the other non-dilution causes of action, which lack the 
“willful violation” qualifier.192 Thus, based on the language of the 
statute, a plaintiff is entitled to relief when there is infringement of a 
registered mark, an unregistered mark, or a mark used as a domain 
name, or when there is a willful violation under the trademark dilution 
provision.193 This revision further obfuscated the confusion among the 
circuits, as disagreement resulted over not only the interpretation of 
the “principles of equity” wording and its relation to willfulness, but 
                                                   
 188. See id. at 439, 441-42 (noting that the addition of the 1999 amendment 
“caused ripples” on the role of willfulness in awarding profits through the already 
divided circuit courts). 
 189. See id. at 440 (“But Congress failed to make the requisite cross-reference 
in § 1117(a) to harmonize that section with the amendment and soon discovered the 
missing link between the two statutory provisions. That statutory mismatch spurred 
the 1999 amendment.”). 
 190. See id. at 440-41. Following the amendment, the remedies provision read: 
When a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark registered in the 
Patent and Trademark Office, a violation under section 1125(a) or (d) of 
this title, or a willful violation under [the dilution provision], shall have been 
established in any civil action arising under this chapter, the plaintiff shall 
be entitled, subject to the provisions of sections 1111 and 1114 of this title, 
and subject to the principles of equity, to recover (1) defendant’s profits, (2) 
any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action. 
15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012). 
 191. See Stone Creek, 875 F.3d at 440-41. Congress’ revision specifically 
added the availability for remedies when establishing a “willful violation” under the 
dilution provision. § 1117(a) (emphasis added). 
 192. See Stone Creek, 875 F.3d at 441. 
 193. See id.  
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also over whether the willfulness requirement is even applicable to 
non-dilution actions due to the wording of the new amendment.194 
The initial circuit to weigh in on the impact of the 1999 
amendment was the Fifth Circuit with the trademark infringement case 
Quick Technologies, Inc. v. Sage Group PLC in 2002.195 Here, the 
Fifth Circuit acknowledged the presence of the 1999 amendment but 
did not analyze the amendment itself beyond a passing mention of the 
amended statute’s “plain language.”196 In Quick Technologies, the 
Fifth Circuit held that the district court improperly issued a jury 
instruction that an award of the defendant’s profits was only proper if 
the infringement was willful.197 While the court reiterated that willful 
infringement remains one important factor to be considered in an 
overall analysis, it again refused to adopt a bright-line rule requiring 
willfulness given its longstanding view that the principles of equity 
are best served by a case-by-case analysis.198 It thus opted to adhere to 
the same “relevant factors” approach it advocated prior to the 1999 
amendment in Pebble Beach.199 
                                                   
 194. See David Welkowitz, Willfulness(R), 79 ALB. L. REV. 509, 514 (2016) 
(“Moreover, the addition of ‘willful violation of section 1125(c)’ caused interpretive 
issues with the rest of the section. Prior to this addition, courts generally agreed that 
recovery of defendant’s profits required some element of bad faith; after the language 
was added, courts disagreed on the proper interpretation of the rest of the section.”); 
see also Stone Creek, 875 F.3d at 441. 
 195. See Quick Techs., Inc. v. Sage Grp. PLC, 313 F.3d 338, 349-50 (5th Cir. 
2002). 
 196. See id. at 348 (“It is important to note, however, that prior to the 
amendment of § 1117(a) on August 5, 1999, there were no references to the term 
‘willful’ in § 1117(a), thus the decisions of our sister circuits are of limited utility to 
the decision we are faced with today.”). The court later went on to decide whether the 
district court’s jury instruction was in error, noting “[i]n accordance with our previous 
decisions, and in light of the plain language of § 1117(a), however, we decline to 
adopt a bright-line rule.” Id. at 349. 
 197. See id. at 350 (noting that the district court erred because “[i]n this case, 
the district judge instructed the jury that it should not reach the issue of awarding 
profits unless it determined there was willful infringement . . . the jury was only 
afforded the opportunity to consider one factor, albeit an important one”). 
 198. See id. at 349 (“It is obvious from our cases that willful infringement is 
an important factor which must be considered when determining whether an 
accounting of profits is appropriate . . . we decline to adopt a bright-line rule in which 
a showing of willful infringement is a prerequisite to an accounting of profits.”). 
 199. See id. As seen in Pebble Beach, the Fifth Circuit factor-based 
determination of awarding profits includes but is not limited to:  
(1) whether the defendant had the intent to confuse or deceive, (2) whether 
sales have been diverted, (3) the adequacy of other remedies, (4) any 
unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in asserting his rights, (5) the public 
interest in making the misconduct unprofitable, and (6) whether it is a case 
of palming off.  
Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 554 (5th Cir. 1998).  
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The Third Circuit next addressed the 1999 amendment’s impact 
on the willfulness requirement in 2005.200 Unlike the Fifth Circuit in 
Quick Technologies, the Third Circuit in Banjo Buddies, Inc. v. 
Renosky specifically analyzed the 1999 amendment itself and then 
switched sides on the willfulness requirement, holding that its 
previous bright-line test was now inappropriate.201 The Third Circuit 
reasoned that Congress’s particular addition of willfulness language 
only to trademark dilution actions must have been intentional, and 
therefore, Congress intended to supersede previous circuit court 
decisions holding willfulness as a prerequisite.202 Interestingly, the 
Third Circuit briefly articulated this view two years earlier in Gucci 
America, Inc. v. Daffy’s, Inc., but the court’s majority did not decide 
which test to adopt because it found that the district court did not abuse 
its discretion in refusing to award profits under the application of 
either test.203 With no previous decisions using a factor-based 
approach, the Third Circuit in Banjo Buddies endorsed and applied the 
Fifth Circuit’s Quick Technologies factors for determining whether 
profits should be awarded.204 
Prior to the 1999 amendment, the Fourth Circuit had not clearly 
addressed the role of willfulness in awarding profits in an infringement 
action.205 However, in 2006’s Synergistic International, LLC v. 
Korman, the Fourth Circuit sided with the Third and Fifth Circuits, 
holding that willfulness is an important, but not dispositive, factor in 
                                                   
 200. See Banjo Buddies, Inc. v. Renosky, 399 F.3d 168, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 201. See id. at 175 (holding that the bright-line test from SecuraComm was 
superseded by the 1999 amendment). 
 202. See id. at 174 (“By adding [willfulness] to the statute in 1999, but limiting 
it to § 43(c) violations, Congress effectively superseded the willfulness requirement 
as applied to § 43(a).”). 
 203. See id. at 175 (“In Gucci America . . . the panel majority noted that the 
1999 amendment might affect the continued validity of SecuraComm’s bright-line 
willfulness requirement. . . . The majority determined it did not need to decide the 
issue, however, reasoning that even under the Quick Technologies factor-based 
approach, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order an 
accounting of the infringer’s profits.”). Judge Rosenn’s dissent in Gucci America 
specifically concluded that the bright-line test was no longer appropriate due to the 
wording of the 1999 amendment, and only an awarding of profits under the factor-
based approach could make the plaintiff whole—even though the infringement was 
not willful. See Gucci Am., Inc. v. Daffy’s, Inc., 354 F.3d 228, 243-49 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(Rosenn, J., dissenting). 
 204. See Banjo Buddies, 399 F.3d at 175 (“Relying on the Quick Technologies 
factor-based approach endorsed in Gucci America, we further conclude that the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion . . . .”). For the Quick Technologies factor-
based approach, derived directly from Pebble Beach, see Quick Techs., Inc. v. Sage 
Grp. PLC, 313 F.3d 338, 349-50 (5th Cir. 2002).  
 205. See Conway-Jones, supra note 146, at 903. 
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the overall analysis.206 The Fourth Circuit based its decision mainly on 
an analysis of the plain statutory language of the amendment rather 
than the principles of equity.207 Like the Third Circuit, the court 
decided that the “willful violation” language included only for the 
trademark dilution cause of action in the amended Lanham Act 
suggested that willfulness was not required to award a defendant’s 
profits in an action for trademark infringement.208 Following the Third 
and Fifth Circuits, the court then adopted the same factor-based 
approach articulated in Quick Technologies.209 
Some courts have acknowledged the presence of the amendment 
but have not yet had to decide, or have declined to decide, whether it 
alters court precedent on the willfulness requirement.210 The First 
Circuit had previously declined to reach the willfulness requirement 
question altogether and later decided not to address the issue again in 
a 2008 case.211 Additionally, the Second Circuit, a steadfast advocate 
of the bright-line rule prior to the 1999 amendment,212 noted in a 2013 
case that the amendment could possibly alter its analysis on awarding 
profits in an infringement action.213 However, the court ultimately did 
not need to resolve the question relating to willfulness and profits and 
still has not yet had the opportunity to do so.214 
                                                   
 206. See Synergistic Int’l, LLC v. Korman, 470 F.3d 162, 175 (4th Cir. 2006) 
(“We agree, however, with the Third and Fifth Circuits that although willfulness is a 
proper and important factor in an assessment of whether to make a damages award, it 
is not an essential predicate thereto. . . . In other words, a lack of willfulness or bad 
faith should weigh against an award of damages being made, but does not necessarily 
preclude such an award.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 207. See id. at n.13. 
 208. See id. (noting that a party’s willfulness contention “may have been more 
persuasive prior to the 1999 amendment to the Lanham Act” because “[p]rior to the 
amendment . . . there was no reference in § 1117(a) to the term ‘willful.’ . . . In light 
of this revision, we agree that willfulness is not an essential prerequisite for a damages 
award, but that it remains a highly pertinent factor.”). 
 209. See id. at 175 (“In making a damages award under the Lanham Act, the 
Third and the Fifth Circuits have identified six factors to guide the process.”). For the 
Quick Technologies factor-based approach, see Quick Techs., 313 F.3d at 349-50. 
 210. See, e.g., Fendi Adele, S.R.L. v. Ashley Reed Trading, Inc., 507 F. App’x 
26, 31 (2d Cir. 2013); Venture Tape Corp. v. McGills Glass Warehouse, 540 F.3d 56, 
63 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 211. See Venture Tape, 540 F.3d at 63 (“We have previously declined to reach 
the question of whether ‘willfulness’ is required as a foundation for such an 
award . . . and we need not decide the issue here.”). 
 212. See Conway-Jones, supra note 146, at 907-08. 
 213. See Fendi Adele, 507 F. App’x at 31. 
 214. See id. (“[S]ome of our sister circuits [have held] that a 1999 amendment 
to the Lanham Act changed the governing rule. However, we need not resolve the 
question . . . .”); see also Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 817 F.3d 782, 790-91 
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The two most recent cases on the willfulness split come from the 
Federal Circuit in 2016 and the Ninth Circuit in 2017.215 In both cases, 
the courts held in favor of the bright-line rule requiring willfulness to 
award profits.216 In Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., the Federal 
Circuit, applying Second Circuit law, held that there was nothing to 
indicate that Second Circuit precedent predating the 1999 amendment 
was no longer good law¾willfulness is required under the “principles 
of equity.”217 In its analysis, the court primarily focused on the 
circumstances surrounding the amendment.218 According to the court, 
the purpose of the 1999 amendment was limited to correcting only an 
error in the dilution cause of action, and further, the legislative history 
gave no indication that Congress had any intention to make a change 
to the law of trademark infringement for likelihood of confusion-based 
claims.219  
The Ninth Circuit in Stone Creek conducted an analysis similar 
to the Federal Circuit in Romag Fasteners.220 In Stone Creek, the court 
took perhaps the most detailed look into the circuit split in any modern 
case.221 After detailing the continued presence of disagreement 
between the circuit courts on the subject of the willfulness language,222 
the Ninth Circuit subtly criticized the other circuit courts for making 
decisions based on the 1999 amendment without incorporating the 
context of the amendment into the analysis.223 For the Ninth Circuit, 
                                                   
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that the Second Circuit has not yet addressed the impact 
of the 1999 amendment). 
 215. See Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 875 F.3d 426, 441 
(9th Cir. 2017); Romag Fasteners, 817 F.3d at 791. 
 216. See Stone Creek, 875 F.3d at 441; Romag Fasteners, 817 F.3d at 791. 
 217. See Romag Fasteners, 817 F.3d at 790-91 (“[W]e see nothing in the 1999 
amendment that allows us to depart from Second Circuit precedent requiring 
willfulness for the recovery of profits in infringement cases.”). 
 218. See id.  
 219. See id. at 789-90 (“[T]he legislative history indicates only that Congress 
sought to correct the mistaken omissions . . . . In short, there is no indication that 
Congress in 1999 intended to make a change in the law of trademark infringement as 
opposed to dilution. The history does not even acknowledge the pre–1999 split in the 
courts of appeals on the willfulness requirement for a recovery of infringer’s profits, 
much less indicate a desire to change it. Given the alleged significance of the 
purported change, one would have expected to see an acknowledgement or discussion 
from Congress of the courts of appeals cases in the relevant area if Congress had 
intended to resolve the circuit conflict.”). 
 220. See Stone Creek, 875 F.3d at 441-42. 
 221. See id. at 439-42 (noting that the history of the circuit split and evolution 
of the remedies provision is imperative to properly understanding the impact of the 
1999 amendment). 
 222. See id. 
 223. See id. at 441 (“We agree with its approach to start with the history of the 
amendment and thoroughly examine the context in which the amendment came to be. 
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the 1999 amendment was illustrative; Congress only amended the Act 
to correct a conspicuous drafting error and did not alter the original 
“subject to the principles of equity” language.224 As a result, Ninth 
Circuit precedent could not be upended.225 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Stone Creek arguably leaves the 
circuit split in just as much flux as it has ever been.226 Even if the 1999 
amendment does not, as the Ninth Circuit and Federal Circuit 
advocate, change the substantive provisions in the Lanham Act, the 
relationship of the underlying principle of equity to willful 
infringement still has left a deep divide among the circuits that has yet 
to be resolved.227 Currently, three circuits advocate for a factor-based 
approach in which willfulness is not required for awarding a 
defendant’s profits, and two circuits advocate for a bright-line 
approach where willfulness is absolutely required for awarding a 
defendant’s profits.228 Of the circuits that have not yet revisited the 
issue after the 1999 amendment, two previously advocated for the 
bright-line rule, and one previously advocated for a factor-based 
determination.229 Because trademarks play such an integral role in 
                                                   
Several circuits have ruled the other way without looking at the backstory of the 
remedies provision. That history is illuminating and reveals why the 1999 amendment 
does not upend our prior interpretation of the remaining language in § 1117(a).” 
(internal citations omitted)).  
 224. Id. at 441-42 (“Congress created a new predicate—namely, a willful 
violation of § 1025(c)—that permits monetary recovery. But it did not touch the other 
language in § 1117(a), which has consistently provided for an award of defendant’s 
profits under the ‘principles of equity.’ Our holding in Lindy Pen—that a plaintiff can 
secure the defendant’s profits only after establishing willfulness—is based entirely on 
an interpretation of that unaltered language.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 225. See id. 
 226. See Turner & Ball, supra note 30 (noting that the Stone Creek holding 
has deepened the divide among circuit courts and simultaneously rejected the push by 
some legal organizations to reduce the impact of the willfulness requirement). 
 227. See, e.g., Stone Creek, 875 F.3d at 442 (“This conclusion [that the 1999 
amendment was only added to correct the drafting error] has added force because we 
see no indication that the legislature meant to take sides in the entrenched circuit split 
on willfulness.”); see Turner & Ball, supra note 30. 
 228. See Stone Creek, 875 F.3d at 441 (holding that willfulness is required); 
Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 817 F.3d 782, 791 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that 
willfulness is required); Synergistic Int’l, LLC v. Korman, 470 F.3d 162, 175 (4th Cir. 
2006) (holding that willfulness is not required); Banjo Buddies, Inc. v. Renosky, 399 
F.3d 168, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that willfulness is not required); Quick 
Techs., Inc. v. Sage Grp. PLC, 313 F.3d 338, 348 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that 
willfulness is not required).  
 229. See George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532, 1541 (2d Cir. 
1992) (holding that willfulness is required); ALPO Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina 
Co., 913 F.2d 958, 968 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that willfulness is required); Roulo 
v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 941 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that willfulness is 
not required). 
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modern society, the circuit split should be analyzed and ultimately 
resolved in favor of the approach that best limits and deters 
infringement.230 
IV. DISCARDING THE BRIGHT-LINE RULE ON WILLFULNESS 
The dual nature of trademarks to protect both the consumer and 
producer is best served by not requiring a rigid, bright-line rule that 
willfulness is required for awarding a defendant’s profits.231 The 
beneficial functions of trademarks are destroyed when infringement is 
not adequately deterred; the lost profits provision should therefore also 
be available for courts to apply as a deterrent regardless of whether the 
infringement is willful.232 The factor-based approach currently 
advocated by the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits best balances both 
the statutory “principles of equity” and protects underlying theories of 
trademark protection; it should therefore be adopted over the Ninth 
Circuit’s rigid, bright-line rule.233 
A. The Functions of Trademarks Are Destroyed by Any 
Infringement, Willful or Not 
The underlying theories and rationales behind trademark 
protection that have developed over thousands of years operate best 
when all trademark infringement is limited, regardless of whether the 
infringement is willful.234 The unique, dual nature of trademarks in 
protecting the rights of both producers and consumers has resulted in 
a myriad of modern theories for protection revolving primarily around 
source identification—the benefits of which are nullified by 
infringement, willful or not.235 The main modern theories and benefits 
of trademark protection with respect to producers include limiting 
                                                   
 230. See Otis Clapp & Son, Inc. v. Filmore Vitamin Co., 754 F.2d 738, 744 
(7th Cir. 1985); Turner & Ball, supra note 30.  
 231. See generally Roulo, 886 F.2d at 941 (discussing the merits of a factor-
based approach with respect to the court’s role in an infringement action); see also 
MENELL, supra note 26, at 866-67 (discussing the dual nature of trademarks in 
protecting the interests of both the consumer and producer). 
 232. See Synergistic, 470 F.3d at 175; Otis Clapp, 754 F.2d at 744; see also 
Landes & Posner, supra note 36, at 269-70. 
 233. See, e.g., Synergistic, 470 F.3d at 175; Banjo Buddies, 399 F.3d at 175; 
Quick Techs., 313 F.3d at 347-49. 
 234. See Synergistic, 470 F.3d at 175; Otis Clapp, 754 F.2d at 744; see also 
Landes & Posner, supra note 36, at 269-70. 
 235. See LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 1.03; MENELL, supra note 26, at 867; 
see also Landes & Posner, supra note 36, at 270 (noting that infringement such as 
free-riding destroys the incentive to invest in the “goodwill” of a mark). 
 Awarding Profits in Trademark Infringement Actions 827 
diversion of trade due to consumer confusion, limiting misattribution 
of a consumer’s dissatisfaction with an infringing product to the senior 
producer, and protecting and incentivizing investment in the goodwill 
of a mark.236 First, consumer confusion that results in a diversion of 
trade can occur whether a mark is infringed willfully or non-
willfully.237 While Griffin, a non-willful infringer of the IBM mark, 
and Cerberus, a willful infringer of the Apple mark, both had different 
intents when infringing, consumers were still equally confused by the 
source of the goods to the extent that they purchased goods from the 
wrong company, diverting sales.238 Further, the test for any trademark 
infringement action is centered on showing a likelihood of consumer 
confusion, and infringer intent plays a minor role, if any, in creating 
that confusion; infringement that destroys the underlying functions of 
a trademark can, and does, occur regardless of the intent of the 
infringer.239  
Second, when a consumer purchases a lower-quality infringing 
product from a non-willful infringer, the consumer may still attribute 
dissatisfaction with the goods to the original trademark holder.240 This 
dissatisfaction could thwart the producer’s goodwill investment in the 
mark, including both time and money, and could resultingly impact 
economic gain if the trademark owner’s reputation is harmed.241 It did 
not ultimately matter that Griffin and Cerberus had different intentions 
when infringing.242 If consumers bought their subpar products thinking 
they were an IBM or Apple product—or otherwise believed that they 
were affiliated with IBM or Apple—the consumer would be likely to 
attribute the low quality to the senior users rather than the infringing 
companies of Griffin or Cerberus.243 The producer’s control over the 
reputation and quality of its mark and goods can be lost when an 
                                                   
 236. See Denicola, supra note 6, at 160-63 (discussing the theories of 
trademark protection relating to diversion of trade, misattribution, and the “good will” 
of the mark); LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 1.03. 
 237. See LALONDE, supra note 2, at §§ 1.03[2], 5.09[1][a] (explaining that a 
misattribution of source resulting in a diversion of trade can effectively happen 
anytime there is a likelihood of confusion—caused willfully or otherwise). 
 238. See id. at § 1.03[2]. 
 239. See LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 5.02; MENELL, supra note 26, at 982 
(explaining that the likelihood of confusion test is used to determine trademark 
infringement). Most circuits include “defendant’s intent” as one of many (generally 
around ten) non-dispositive factors in the likelihood of confusion analysis. See 
LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 5.09. 
 240. See Denicola, supra note 6, at 163; LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 1.03[2]. 
 241. See Denicola, supra note 6, at 163; LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 1.03[2]; 
see also MENELL, supra note 26, at 867. 
 242. See LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 1.03[2]. 
 243. See id. 
828 Michigan State Law Review  2018 
infringer’s harmful actions are linked to the producer’s mark, 
regardless of whether the infringer is acting in bad faith or has non-
malicious intent.244 If other competitors such as Griffin and Cerberus 
are constantly infringing on Apple’s or IBM’s products with other low 
quality goods, there is little—if any—incentive for Apple or IBM to 
spend money and time to ensure their goods are high quality if their 
reputations would be ruined regardless.245 Apple or IBM’s ability to 
manage the reputation and goodwill of their marks is effectively 
destroyed no matter the intent of the infringer.246 
For the consumer, trademarks most importantly function to 
allow the differentiation of goods, which reduces the likelihood of 
confusion or deception and fulfills the long-standing tort-based policy 
that the court has an overarching duty to protect the public.247 It is 
inherently good under today’s system of law for consumers not to be 
deceived or confused.248 However, regardless of whether a company 
intends to deceive consumers by willful infringement or does so 
accidentally, both types of infringement can cause consumer 
confusion.249 As noted above, consumers became confused over both 
Griffin’s non-willfully infringing goods and Cerberus’ willfully 
infringing goods.250  
Beyond the inherent good in reducing deception and confusion 
for consumers, trademarks also provide economic efficiency for 
consumers.251 The economic efficiency of trademarks is destroyed 
when trademarks are falsely duplicated, regardless of willfulness or 
intent; consumers cannot quickly use trademarks to distinguish the 
brands of products when trademarks are duplicated.252 A consumer 
                                                   
 244. See LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 1.03[2] (“Much of trademark law is 
focused on preventing a likelihood of consumer confusion as to the source of goods. 
Say that a consumer believes in error that brand new BOUNCE chewing gum is made 
by the same producer as established BOUNCY chewing gum. The owner of the 
BOUNCY mark has lost control over its reputation and is unable to maintain the 
quality of its product in consumers’ minds. The consumer could find that BOUNCE 
gum tastes like dirt and disintegrates when chewed, and would attribute that poor 
quality to BOUNCY gum because of his or her confusion as to source.”). 
 245. See Landes & Posner, supra note 36, at 270 (noting that if a trademark 
does not lower search costs due to inconsistent quality—perhaps because of 
infringement—companies will be reluctant to make additional expenditures). 
 246. See Denicola, supra note 6, at 163. 
 247. See, e.g., LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 1.03[6][a].  
 248. See MENELL, supra note 26, at 867. 
 249. See LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 5.09[1][a] (explaining that a likelihood 
of confusion—and actual confusion—can be found even without intent). 
 250. See id. 
 251. See Landes & Posner, supra note 36, at 268-70. 
 252. See id. at 269 (“To perform its economizing function a trademark or 
brand name . . . must not be duplicated.”). 
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who likes Apple phones can easily walk into the store and use Apple 
trademarks to explain to a clerk which item he or she would like to 
purchase—for instance, the “iPhone X.”253 However, if Cerberus 
willfully infringes or Griffin non-willfully infringes and creates 
another “iPhone X,” the consumer would no longer be able to specify 
his or her preference using the trademark alone.254 The consumer 
instead would have to describe the product in some detail, which takes 
more time and is more confusing overall.255 Simply stating that one 
would like to purchase an “iPhone X” is much easier than attempting 
to specifically describe which of the many Apple products the 
consumer wants to purchase.256 
Ultimately, infringement is a thorn in the side of trademark 
owners because it undermines the value and benefit of trademarks and 
the reason they are protected in the first place.257 This undermining 
holds true regardless of whether the infringement is willful or non-
willful or whether the injured party is a consumer or producer.258 
Courts should therefore have available every action under their power 
to limit infringement—including the option to award trademark 
owners the infringer’s profits—whether the infringement is willful or 
not.259 
B. Applying the Lost Profits Remedy to More Conduct Expands the 
Deterrent Scope 
Many courts state that the role of the court under the Lanham 
Act is primarily to make violations of the Act unprofitable so as to 
limit and deter violations.260 It follows that courts should utilize the 
deterrent power of the lost profits measure to best discourage both 
                                                   
 253. See id. at 268-69. This example is analogous to Landes’s and Posner’s 
“Sanka” example; it is easier to ask for and remember “Sanka” rather than “the 
decaffeinated coffee made by General Foods.” Id. 
 254. See id. at 269 (“To allow another maker of decaffeinated coffee to sell its 
coffee under the name ‘Sanka’ would destroy the benefit of the name in identifying a 
brand of decaffeinated coffee made by General Foods . . . .”). 
 255. See id. (“This takes longer to say, requires you to remember more, and 
requires the waiter or clerk to read and remember more . . . .”). 
 256. See id. at 268-69. 
 257. See LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 1.03; MENELL, supra note 26, at 867. 
 258. See LALONDE, supra note 2, at §§ 1.03, 5.09; MENELL, supra note 26, at 
867. 
 259. See Synergistic Int’l, LLC v. Korman, 470 F.3d 162, 175 (4th Cir. 2006); 
Otis Clapp & Son, Inc. v. Filmore Vitamin Co., 754 F.2d 738, 746 (7th Cir. 1985); 
see also Landes & Posner, supra note 36, at 270. 
 260. See, e.g., Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 941 (7th Cir. 1989); 
Otis Clapp, 754 F.2d at 744 (“The trial court’s primary function is to make violations 
of the Lanham Act unprofitable to the infringing party.”). 
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willful and non-willful trademark infringement, especially because 
trademarks function most optimally when all infringement is 
limited.261 By advocating an approach where willfulness is required, 
courts like the Ninth Circuit do not deter infringing conduct to their 
full capacity because there are inherently fewer scenarios in which the 
bright-line rule applies.262 Willful infringement, as universally 
accepted by courts, includes infringement with intent to deceive 
consumers and, in some cases, also includes situations where bad faith 
is presumed because the infringer knows or understands that he or she 
is infringing.263 Other intentional conduct, such as imitating the 
commercially successful aspects of a plaintiff’s design, is considered 
non-willful conduct and is wholly excluded from the lost profits 
remedy in the Ninth Circuit and Federal Circuit.264 Each of these two 
scenarios can constitute infringement and both can include intentional, 
conscious acts, but courts such as the Ninth Circuit do not treat the 
two scenarios similarly when determining remedies.265 Thus, in the 
Ninth Circuit, the court’s ability to use the extra deterrent measure of 
awarding an infringer’s profits to the trademark owner is extremely 
limited and not used optimally to limit infringement.266 Courts should 
employ the full extent of their powers to deter such infringement and 
protect a trademark’s functions.267 
Some commentators contend that awarding a defendant’s profits 
to the plaintiff is only effective and permissible for willful infringers 
based on the idea that only willful infringers have conducted a 
                                                   
 261. See Landes & Posner, supra note 36, at 269-70. 
 262. See Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 875 F.3d 426, 439 
(9th Cir. 2017). 
 263. See, e.g., Stone Creek, 875 F.3d at 434 (discussing how, in some 
scenarios, the Ninth Circuit can presume an intent to deceive if the infringement is 
knowing or understood); George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532, 1537 
(2d Cir. 1992) (discussing how willful infringement requires intent to deceive). 
 264. See George Basch, 968 F.2d at 1541 (“There is an ‘essential 
distinction . . . between a deliberate attempt to deceive and a deliberate attempt to 
compete. Absent confusion, imitation of certain successful features in another’s 
product is not unlawful and to that extent a ‘free ride’ is permitted.”); LALONDE, supra 
note 2, at § 5.09 (discussing how courts determine intent, although in the analogous 
likelihood of confusion determination). 
 265. See Stone Creek, 875 F.3d at 439-43 (discussing that the Ninth Circuit 
only uses the lost profits provision for willful infringers).  
 266. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012). 
 267. See Roulo v. Russ Berrie & Co., 886 F.2d 931, 941 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(discussing that the Seventh Circuit and Ninth Circuit have stated previously that the 
court’s function is to make violations of the Lanham Act unprofitable—presumably 
to deter infringement); Landes & Posner, supra note 36, at 269. 
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deliberate wrong that could be deterred in the future.268 However, 
willful infringement only encompasses infringement with intent to 
deceive, or in some courts, when deception is presumed based on 
knowledge that the use would be infringing.269 This view does not 
account for instances of non-willful infringement that can also be 
deterred. For example, Griffin knowingly and intentionally took 
commercially successful aspects of IBM’s logo, but it was unaware 
that the amount taken would be infringing and it did not intend to be 
deceptive.270  
Requiring willfulness as a bright-line rule to award profits 
actually seems to encourage willful blindness and to discourage 
producers from performing due diligence because there is no penalty 
for neglecting to invest time and resources in doing adequate 
research.271 A business can skimp on its due diligence of researching 
previously registered marks with no fear of losing profits earned using 
that mark if it becomes the subject of a future infringement action.272 
Unless the business intended to deceive or knew the use would cause 
confusion, it will not have to relinquish profits, even if it intended to 
copy commercially successful aspects.273 This concept is undesirable 
from a policy perspective as well as from an “equity” perspective.274 
Thus, the factor-based approach, which considers intent as one of 
many factors, incentivizes companies to do sufficient research prior to 
                                                   
 268. See Zisek, supra note 129, at 486-87 (“Deterrence is an attractive aim 
because it can prevent future willful violations of a trademark through disregarding a 
competitor’s rights, belittling a competitor’s mark, and blatantly utilizing a mark 
despite knowledge of its previous use. This theory indicates to the general public that 
this deliberate conduct is wrongful and could be subject to punitive exemplary 
damages, subject to equitable limitations.”). 
 269. See, e.g., Stone Creek, 875 F.3d at 434; George Basch, 968 F.2d at 1541. 
 270. See George Basch, 968 F.2d at 1541. Griffin is an example of an infringer 
of the type referenced by the court that inadvertently and non-willfully crosses the 
line into infringement intending only to compete in the market using what “works” 
and is commercially successful. See id.  
 271. See Stone Creek, 862 F.3d at 434; George Basch, 968 F.2d at 1541; see 
also LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 5.09[4][e]. This is because the bright-line rule is 
only applicable to producers that intend to deceive, or sometimes, knowingly use an 
infringing mark. See, e.g., Stone Creek, 862 F.3d at 434; George Basch, 968 F.2d at 
1541. 
 272. See Stone Creek, 862 F.3d at 434; George Basch, 968 F.2d at 1541; see 
also LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 5.09[4][e]. 
 273. See George Basch, 968 F.2d at 1541. 
 274. The Lanham Act requires remedies to be given “subject to the principles 
of equity.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012); cf. LALONDE, supra note 2, at § 5.09[4][e]. 
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adopting a trademark because there is more for companies to lose if 
profits are at stake.275 
Forcing a defendant trademark infringer to turn over profits is a 
powerful deterrent.276 Allowing infringers who fail to do adequate due 
diligence or willfully blind themselves to avoid relinquishing 
infringing profits encourages bad business practices.277 Therefore, 
using the lost profits remedy only for willful infringers is not effective 
deterrence and it further puts the underlying functions of trademarks 
in jeopardy.278 
C. Applying the Bright-Line Test Creates Inequitable Results 
Courts not requiring infringers to turn over earned profits in 
cases of non-willful infringement potentially allows infringers to walk 
away with a windfall if they intentionally used aspects of another’s 
mark but did not intend to deceive consumers outright.279 For example, 
Griffin intentionally used aspects of the IBM logo because it is 
commercially successful, yet Griffin did not intend to infringe IBM’s 
mark or deceive consumers.280 Griffin then made a profit—even if only 
minimal—and pocketed it despite using an infringing mark.281 In a 
jurisdiction such as the Ninth Circuit, despite the obvious harm to the 
plaintiff, if the trademark infringement was not done with “an intent 
to deceive” or while knowingly infringing, the plaintiff cannot recover 
any of the defendant’s earned profits.282 The infringer could 
theoretically pay attorney’s fees and the plaintiff’s damages as ordered 
by the court but still leave with a net profit earned from using the 
infringing mark.283 Giving infringers the theoretical ability to emerge 
from an infringement action breaking even or pocketing profits does 
                                                   
 275. See Otis Clapp & Son, Inc. v. Filmore Vitamin Co., 754 F.2d 738, 744 
(7th Cir. 1985) (discussing the importance of the deterrence effect and the court’s 
role). 
 276. See id. at 744 (“Such a method of enforcement [allowing only nominal 
damages] would fail to serve as a convincing deterrent to the profit maximizing 
entrepreneur who engages in trademark piracy.”). 
 277. See id. 
 278. See Synergistic Int’l, LLC v. Korman, 470 F.3d 162, 175 (4th Cir. 2006); 
Otis Clapp, 754 F.2d at 744; see also Landes & Posner, supra note 36, at 269-70. 
 279. See Otis Clapp, 754 F.2d at 744. 
 280. See George Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532, 1541 (2d Cir. 
1992) (explaining that actions similar to those of Griffin are not considered willful 
infringement). 
 281. See id. 
 282. See Stone Creek, Inc. v. Omnia Italian Design, Inc., 875 F.3d 426, 439 
(9th Cir. 2017). 
 283. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2012) (listing the damages allowed under the 
Lanham Act). 
 Awarding Profits in Trademark Infringement Actions 833 
not deter infringement.284 In contrast, in an identical scenario under the 
factor-based approach, the court could determine that an infringer is 
required to give the plaintiff the profits earned directly by infringing, 
destroying any incentive to infringe in the first place.285 Even where 
the defendant does not satisfy the “willful infringement” factor of the 
Pebble Beach and Quick Technologies balancing test, the court still 
has the latitude to order the defendant to pay profits based on other 
factors, including evidence of diverted sales, the adequacy of other 
Lanham Act remedies in producing an equitable result, and the public 
interest in making the misconduct unprofitable.286 
Furthermore, courts like the Second Circuit have justified 
applying the bright-line rule because, in the absence of such a rule, 
windfall judgments can be awarded to the plaintiff, which frustrates 
principles of equity.287 However, the factor-based test employed by the 
Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits takes equity principles into account 
when determining if an award of profits is even appropriate in the first 
place.288 For example, factors in the overall weighing—which are not 
exhaustive—include the actual harm to the plaintiff and the adequacy 
of other Lanham Act remedies in producing an equitable result.289 If 
the plaintiff is not actually harmed or other remedies proscribed by the 
Lanham Act290 adequately compensate the plaintiff and deter the 
infringing conduct, the court can decline to award the defendant’s 
profits to avoid a windfall judgment.291 In turn, it seems that the bright-
line rule actually creates a “draconian impact”in favor of the infringer 
rather than the innocent party due to its rigid, all-or-nothing criteria.292 
                                                   
 284. See Otis Clapp, 754 F.2d at 744. 
 285. See, e.g., Banjo Buddies, Inc. v. Renosky, 399 F.3d 168, 174-75 (3d Cir. 
2005); Quick Techs., Inc. v. Sage Grp. PLC, 313 F.3d 338, 349-50 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 286. See Quick Techs., 313 F.3d at 349-50. 
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 288. See Quick Techs., 313 F.3d at 349. The Quick Technologies test includes 
the following factors (though not exhaustive) to determine if an award of profits is 
even appropriate:  
(1) whether the defendant had the intent to confuse or deceive, (2) whether 
sales have been diverted, (3) the adequacy of other remedies, (4) any 
unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in asserting his rights, (5) the public 
interest in making the misconduct unprofitable, and (6) whether it is a case 
of palming off. 
Id. 
 289. See id. 
 290. These other remedies can include attorney’s fees and the plaintiff’s lost 
profits. See, e.g., George Basch, 968 F.2d at 1540. 
 291. See Quick Techs., 313 F.3d at 349. 
 292. Cf. id.; George Basch, 968 F.2d at 1540. 
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The factor-based approach currently adopted by the Third, 
Fourth, and Fifth Circuits should be adopted universally because it 
best balances protecting both the “principles of equity” and the 
beneficial functions of trademarks.293 The functions of trademarks are 
destroyed by infringement, willful or not, as both willful and non-
willful infringement can create a likelihood of confusion.294 Allowing 
courts the option of applying the lost profits remedy to a greater range 
of infringement actions, rather than only when the infringement is 
willful, expands the court’s deterrent scope and optimally limits 
infringement.295 Furthermore, the factor-based approach discourages 
willful blindness and encourages businesses to do adequate due 
diligence and research prior to adopting a trademark.296 Regardless of 
any statutory interpretation of the Lanham Act and its amendments, 
the beneficial functions of trademarks dating back thousands of years 
are best protected by the factor-based approach that does not require 
willfulness to award a defendant’s profits in trademark infringement 
actions.297 
CONCLUSION 
Trademarks can be found nearly anywhere in modern society—
whether at home, at work, in stores, on television, or on the internet.298 
Each individual in society interacts with thousands of trademarks each 
day, and trademarks, in some respects, even make lives easier.299 
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Accordingly, trademarks have become huge, intangible assets for 
businesses, with top trademarks worth billions of dollars.300 
Trademarks protect interests of both the consumer and the producer, 
but they are vulnerable to the danger of infringement via a likelihood 
of confusion, which destroys the modern functions of trademarks even 
if infringement is not willful.301 It is therefore imperative that courts 
use all available means, including the threat of awarding the 
infringer’s profits, to deter infringers and protect the underlying 
functions of trademarks.302 The courts should universally adopt the 
factor-based approach currently advocated by the Third, Fourth, and 
Fifth Circuits because it best balances the “principles of equity” 
required by the Lanham Act with the deterrent ability of the courts.303 
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